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I. INTRODUCTION 
The conversation about immigration adjudication has shifted from 
one detailing shortcomings to one addressing solutions.1  When 
formulating solutions, it is important to look beyond any one contributor 
to the crisis and to promote a holistic view.  Recent proposals for 
immigration adjudication reform acknowledge that fixing the system 
requires a multi-faceted approach.2  This Article confirms the need for 
such an approach by showing how one popular cause of the crisis, a lack 
of decisional independence, only scratches the surface of what ails the 
immigration adjudication system.  Along the way, the Article uncovers 
and evaluates underappreciated crisis contributors. 
While decisional independence is crucial, it is vital to understand and 
to emphasize that achieving decisional independence will not fix all of 
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 1. This conversation is mostly focused on the adjudication of removal proceedings, and 
removal proceedings comprise the center of this Article as well.  There are other kinds of 
immigration adjudication, however.  For example, United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, a branch of the Department of Homeland Security, considers applications for immigration 
benefits, such as applications for legal permanent resident status.  See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 (2010). 
Certain benefit determinations may be appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office, and there 
might be judicial review of the final order.  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DELEGATION 
TO THE BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, DELEGATION 0150.1 § 2(U) (Mar. 1, 
2003) (granting authority “to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the matters described in 8 C.F.R.  
§ 103.1(f)(3)(E)(iii) (as in effect on Feb. 28, 2003)”).  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). 
 2. See infra note 29. 
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what ails immigration adjudication.3  Focusing attention away from this 
one factor reveals five other substantial contributors to the shortcomings 
of immigration adjudication: substantive immigration law; the 
conflicting signals of immigration adjudication; the lack of de facto 
independence; the use of diversions from the system; and weakened 
judicial review.  If these other contributors are not addressed, any reform 
will likely produce disappointing results. 
These other contributors are causes of some of the system’s deepest 
troubles.  The harshness, complexity, and opacity of substantive 
immigration law create more adjudication, thus adding to huge backlogs 
in the system.  These features of substantive immigration law also 
contribute to an extreme lack of lawyers in the system by making 
immigration law an insulated realm practiced by too few.  The nature of 
the substantive law also creates immigration law’s low esteem problem, 
which, in turn, affects representation rates and the quality of 
adjudication.  A confused sense of mission—the result of conflicting 
signals built into the system—also contributes to the crisis.  The lack of 
de facto independence for immigration adjudicators is stark, as 
adjudicators simply do not have the resources that they need.  Also 
troublesome is a growing use of diversions from immigration 
adjudication.  These diversions threaten to make the system accessible to 
only select groups.  Finally, the system demands more robust judicial 
review, as restrictions on judicial review thwart the functioning of the 
system. 
II. DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 
CRISIS 
Immigration adjudication is in serious need of reform.  The system is 
in crisis, with many diverse constituencies expressing extreme concerns.  
Federal judges, immigration judges, an Attorney General, the U.S. 
                                                     
 3. Others have acknowledged the importance of thinking about immigration adjudication 
reform in a broad context.  Professor Lenni Benson has argued that a more detailed and 
comprehensive understanding of judicial review of administrative immigration decision-making is a 
prerequisite to reforming judicial review.  See Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here: 
Managing Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 406.  Also, Professor 
Margaret Taylor has argued that factors other than “place in the administrative bureaucracy” 
influence the quality of immigration administrative adjudication.  Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee 
Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 500 (2007).  In this spirit, this Article argues that the approach 
to immigration adjudication reform should identify and integrate all contributors to the problems of 
the system. 
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Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility, scholars, 
politicians, and lawyers have all expressed extreme misgivings about the 
system.4  This Part describes the role that decisional independence plays 
in the crisis.  The next Part evaluates other contributors to the crisis. 
The main purpose of the adjudication system is to adjudicate 
removal cases.  In a removal case, the government charges a foreign 
national with an immigration violation that may result in expulsion from 
the United States.5  The system is comprised of immigration judges, who 
make up the trial level of administrative adjudication,6 the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, which is the administrative body that hears appeals 
from immigration judge decisions,7 and the federal courts of appeals, 
which review some of the output of the administrative adjudicatory 
process.8 
One major problem with the system is a lack of decisional 
independence at the administrative level.9  The lack of decisional 
independence stems from the placement of immigration judges and the 
Board as mere employees of the Attorney General.  The entire Board 
exists by regulation only, and the Attorney General is ultimately in 
charge of hiring, firing, training, and reviewing the immigration judge 
corps.10  The bureaucratic placement of the adjudicators signals 
dependence on a politically appointed prosecutor. 
                                                     
 4. See Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 598–611 (2009). 
 5. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a). 
 6. See id. § 1003.10. 
 7. See id. § 1003.1. 
 8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006). 
 9. Here, I adopt Professor Stephen Legomsky’s focus on one type of constraint on decisional 
independence.  Professor Legomsky has explored “the threat of personal consequences for the 
adjudicator” in the context of immigration adjudication.  Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the 
War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 389 (2006).  Professor Legomsky described: 
Under this constraint, the case is presumed to be one that the law clearly allows the 
adjudicator to decide, and there is no attempt by a superior to directly dictate the outcome 
of that case, but there are general threats, real or perceived, that decisions which displease 
an executive official could pose professional risks for the adjudicator. 
Id.  Professor Legomsky has argued that decisional independence is necessary, at a minimum, at 
some point in the immigration adjudication system to uphold the rule of law.  See id. at 386, 394–
401, 403. 
 10. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1; Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673, 53,673 (Sept. 20, 
2007) (to be codified at 8 CFR pts. 1003, 1240) (explaining that immigration judges are 
“Department of Justice attorneys who are designated by the Attorney General to conduct such 
proceedings, and they are subject to the Attorney General’s direction and control”). 
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Establishing immigration adjudication under the thumb of the 
country’s top prosecutor establishes a prosecutorial-focused work 
environment and sends a signal that the adjudicators who work for him 
carry a prosecutorial bent.11  This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
Attorney General also oversees the Office of Immigration Litigation, 
which represents the government in civil immigration cases before the 
federal courts.12  Also, the Attorney General has the ability to overrule a 
decision of the Board.13  Board members adjudicate with the knowledge 
that their boss, a politically appointed prosecutor, may take a case away 
from them. 
The link between the supervision of the Attorney General and the 
lack of decisional independence is perhaps best exemplified by two 
controversies that developed during President George W. Bush’s 
administration.  First, there is evidence that Attorney General John 
Ashcroft used his power over immigration adjudication to fire 
ideologically selected members of the Board of Immigration Appeals.  
Second, the Department of Justice determined that the Bush 
administration used its power over the hiring of immigration adjudicators 
to hire new adjudicators based on their political loyalties instead of their 
professional qualifications. 
There is evidence that, in 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft fired 
those Board members whose decisions were more favorable to foreign 
nationals.14  Ashcroft completed this downsizing as a part of an effort to 
streamline the work of the Board, with the objective of decreasing the 
Board’s backlog of 56,000 cases.15  The streamlining program also 
prevented the remaining Board members from giving reasons for their 
decisions in a majority of cases.16  The President of the National 
Association of Immigration Judges, Dana Leigh Marks, has explained 
that immigration judges saw the Board firings as politically motivated 
                                                     
 11. See AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE 
INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF 
REMOVAL CASES, at ES-44 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/migrated/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
ABA STUDY]. 
 12. Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I 
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 3–4, 10–11 (2008). 
 13. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (detailing when the Board shall refer cases to the Attorney 
General, including when the Attorney General so requests). 
 14. See Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration 
Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1154 (2004) (analyzing case data 
surrounding the Board member firings); see also Legomsky, supra note 9, at 376. 
 15. See Family, supra note 4, at 605; Legomsky, supra note 9, at 375–76. 
 16. Family, supra note 4, at 605. 
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and serving as a warning to immigration judges.17  Immigration Judge 
Marks called the Attorney General’s actions “selective downsizing” and 
noted the “chilling effect” of the firings.18  As employees of the Attorney 
General, immigration judges felt political pressure on their rulings. 
A politicized hiring process has also highlighted the fragility of 
immigration adjudication.  The U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Professional Responsibility and the U.S. Department of Justice Inspector 
General issued a report detailing the unlawful politicization of hiring for 
immigration judge positions during the Bush administration.19  
Immigration judges fill career civil service positions.20  These are not 
purely political positions.21  The report concluded that members of the 
Bush administration violated civil service laws and departmental policy 
in selecting candidates for immigration judge positions based on political 
ties and recommendations rather than based on professional 
qualifications.22  At times, individuals were hired based on political 
recommendations without interviews or any vetting by career 
immigration adjudication specialists in the Department.23  Additionally, 
those appointed with immigration law experience “were prosecutors or 
held other immigration enforcement jobs,” as opposed to experience 
representing the interests of foreign nationals.24  Hiring adjudicators 
based on political loyalties sent a message to all adjudicators that those 
who acted in-step with the Attorney General would be rewarded. 
A lack of decisional independence is one problem facing the 
immigration adjudication system.  Recent proposals to fix this 
adjudication system envision the achievement of decisional 
independence as at least a key component of the solution to the 
immigration adjudication problem.25  Some proposals which advocate for 
                                                     
 17. See Marks, supra note 12, at 11 n.52. 
 18. Id. at 11, 14. 
 19. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING 
BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opr/goodling072408.pdf. 
 20. Id. at 70. 
 21. Id. at 11–15. 
 22. See id. at 69, 115. 
 23. Id. at 75, 81–82, 88–90, 105. 
 24. Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on GOP Ties; Law 
Forbids Practice; Courts Being Reshaped, WASH. POST, June 11, 2007, at A1. 
 25. See ABA STUDY, supra note 11, at ES-43 to -44; AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, 
ISSUE PAPER: THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN OUR IMMIGRATION 
COURTS (2006), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=8382; APPLESEED, 
ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 35 (2009), 
available at http://www.appleseednetwork.org/Portals/0/Documents/Publications/Assembly%20Line 
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decisional independence call for the creation of an Article I immigration 
court, which would remove immigration adjudicators from the 
supervision of the Attorney General.26  Another proposal would achieve 
the same goal through the creation of an independent executive agency to 
house immigration adjudication.27  Another promotes increased job 
security for immigration judges, along with the creation of an Article III 
immigration court as a path toward decisional independence.28 
This Article is not at odds with these proposals for reform, as they 
acknowledge that creating decisional independence is not the only 
necessary fix.29  This Article, however, deconstructs the crisis in a way 
that reveals different ingredients to the crisis recipe, as well as analyzes 
some previously recognized contributors in different contexts. 
III. BEYOND DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
This Part looks beyond decisional independence to identify and 
examine five other contributors to the unsatisfactory state of immigration 
adjudication.  In addition to establishing decisional independence, 
successful immigration adjudication reform is linked to the state of 
substantive immigration law, resolving the conflicting signals of 
immigration adjudication, the creation of de facto independence for  
                                                                                                                       
%20Injustice.pdf; JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 103–04 (2009); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring 
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1677, 1689–92 (2010); Marks, supra note 12, at 20–
21. 
 26. See ABA STUDY, supra note 11, at ES-47 to -48; APPLESEED, supra note 25, at 35; RAMJI-
NOGALES ET AL., supra note 25, at 103–04; Marks, supra note 12, at 16–17. 
 27. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, supra note 25. 
 28. Legomsky, supra note 25, at 1640, 1686–87. 
 29. See ABA STUDY, supra note 11, at ES-54 to -71 (proposing changes to substantive 
immigration law, recognizing the need for higher representation rates, advocating for wider judicial 
review, arguing for curtailed use of some diversions from administrative adjudication and 
emphasizing that immigration adjudicators must have sufficient resources and training, in addition to 
structural reform); AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, supra note 25 (pointing out a lack of 
resources); APPLESEED, supra note 25, at 10–11, 17, 29 (recognizing the need for more resources, 
the role of prosecutorial discretion, and the lack of representation); RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra 
note 25, at 100–18 (advocating the creation of an Article I immigration court to depoliticize the 
asylum adjudication process but also calling for increased professionalization and for amending the 
standard of review of Board decisions, among other things); Legomsky, supra note 25, at 1639–40 
(acknowledging that “restructuring, although essential to reform of the immigration adjudication 
system, is not sufficient” and arguing that the principal causes of the crisis are “severe underfunding, 
reckless procedural shortcuts, the inappropriate politicization of the process, and a handful of 
adjudicators personally ill-suited to the task”); Marks, supra note 12, at 14 (describing a “persistent 
lack of resources”). 
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immigration adjudicators, the proper use of diversions from immigration 
adjudication, and a stronger role for the federal courts. 
A. The Limits of Decisional Independence: Lessons from the Veterans 
Court 
The Court of Appeals of Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) provides 
an example of how the institution of decisional independence can lead to 
disappointing reform.  From the lessons of the Veterans Court, we can 
see that meaningful immigration adjudication reform depends not just on 
the adoption of one particular structural framework, but on a more 
holistic approach that more broadly emphasizes other contributing 
characteristics in addition to decisional independence.30  Incorporating 
the Article I structure by itself, for example, may improve decisional 
independence,31 but may not address other problems plaguing the system. 
The experience of the Veterans Court is evidence that a pro-
decisional independence structural change is not a guaranteed panacea.32  
Over twenty years ago, Congress responded to calls of dissatisfaction 
with the adjudication of veterans’ benefits claims by creating the 
Veterans Court.33  Before this reform, applications for veterans’ benefits 
were simply not subject to review beyond the decision of the 
administrative Board of Veterans Appeals.34  This lack of review led to 
concerns about fairness; that veterans deserved a neutral body to hear 
                                                     
 30. There are doubts about the effectiveness of broad bureaucratic organizations generally.  
Jeffrey Manns, Legislation Comment, Reorganization as a Substitute for Reform: The Abolition of 
the INS, 112 YALE L.J. 145, 146 (2002) (explaining that “the literature on [bureaucratic] 
reorganizations casts doubt on their efficacy as a vehicle for reform”). 
 31. It is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate whether a change in structure will, in fact, 
improve decisional independence. 
 32. An Article I Immigration Court, consisting of both trial and appellate levels, with available 
judicial review, would look structurally different than the veterans’ benefits adjudication process.  A 
veteran files a claim for benefits first with a regional office of the Veterans Administration.  Michael 
P. Allen, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at Twenty: A Proposal for a 
Legislative Commission to Consider Its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 365–66 (2009).  If that 
claim is denied, there is some opportunity for reconsideration within the regional office, followed by 
an appeal to the Board of Veterans Appeals, if desired.  Id. at 366.  An appeal from the Board of 
Veterans Appeals lands at the Article I Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.  Id. at 367–68.  From 
there, a limited appeal right exists to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  Id. at 368.  
Analysis of the Article I Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is instructive here, however, because 
it is an example of pro-independence reform that has failed to quiet calls for further adjudication 
reform. 
 33. See id. at 364, 375–76. 
 34. See id. at 375. 
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their appeals and to issue better quality decisions.35  To improve the 
process, Congress created the Article I Veterans Court to hear appeals 
from the administrative Board of Veterans Appeals and established 
limited federal court jurisdiction over the decisions of the Article I 
court.36  The Article I court is staffed by at most nine judges serving 
fifteen-year terms.37  These judges are appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.38 
Even after the creation of the Article I Veterans Court, the 
adjudication of veterans’ cases is still highly controversial and marked by 
numerous observed shortcomings.39  Critics assert that the Veterans 
Court is not truly independent, that it faces crippling caseloads, and that 
its existence has not improved the quality of agency adjudication.40  
These shortcomings are serious enough to have led to a call for a 
legislative commission to study the future of the court.41 
Concerns surround the relationship between the Veterans Court and 
the Veterans Administration.  These concerns focus on whether the 
Veterans Court is truly independent.  As one observer put it, “The 
Department continues to treat the Veterans Court in a manner 
inconsistent with an independent adjudicative body.”42  This observer 
described a scenario where the agency, unhappy with a decision of the 
Veterans Court, ordered its own adjudicators to stay any cases raising the 
same issue rather than to adjudicate those cases under the unpopular 
decision of the independent Veterans Court.43  The agency’s behavior 
effectively nullified the decision of the Veterans Court.44  Another 
observer wrote that “the [Veterans Court] does not exhibit the will to 
compel the [Veterans Administration] to deliver timely and accurate 
                                                     
 35. Id. at 375–76. 
 36. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251–7252, 7292 (2006). 
 37. 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a), (h), (i) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
 38. 38 U.S.C. § 7253(b) (2006). 
 39. Some acknowledged advancements have been credited to the Article I court, but the overall 
perspective is that the system still is not satisfactory.  The Article I court is credited with the 
development of a body of case law concerning veterans’ benefits.  Allen, supra note 32, at 372–73.  
The formal independence of the court from the Veterans Administration has also been recognized, 
along with an increased perception of fairness (at least when compared with the lack of review that 
existed before).  Id. at 373–76.  Finally, the Article I court is credited with some improvement of the 
quality of decisions issued by the Veterans Administration.  Id. at 376–77. 
 40. See id. at 377–87. 
 41. Id. at 387–90. 
 42. Id. at 381. 
 43. Id. at 381–83. 
 44. See id. 
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service to those who present claims.”45  This analysis describes a 
Veterans Court habit of the “painless remand,” where the Veterans 
Administration does not face a “meaningful consequence” for errors in 
adjudication.46  In other words, the Article I court issues a weak remand 
instead of a strong reversal.47  This analysis questions the true 
independence of the Article I court by labeling it “an extension of [the] 
in-house review mechanism.”48 
As far as caseloads, concerns surround the length of time it takes for 
the Veterans Court to adjudicate an appeal.  In 2007, the median time to 
adjudicate a case at the Article I court was 416 days.49  The wait is at 
least partially due to a huge caseload at the Veterans Court, which has 
led to the use of single-judge opinions.50 
The creation of the Article I Veterans Court also has not diminished 
criticism of the quality of the benefits adjudication process before the 
administrative agency.  In January 2010, the television show 60 Minutes 
broadcasted a segment titled, “Veterans’ Benefit Frustrations.”51  The 
segment highlighted the large backlog of claims awaiting initial 
adjudication, examined the complicated nature of the application process, 
and questioned the quality of adjudication.52  The segment reported on a 
motto for the process created by benefit applicants: “Delay, Deny and 
Hope that I Die.”53 
Whether some disagree with these critiques of the Article I Veterans 
Court, it is important to recognize that the reform of creating an Article I 
Veterans Court, complete with the promise of decisional independence, 
did not end concerns about the quality of veterans’ benefits adjudication.  
Even an independent Article I court can face challenges asserting a lack 
of independence and a lack of efficiency, and the creation of the Article I  
                                                     
 45. James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process is 
Needed to Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 228 (2001). 
 46. Id. at 233. 
 47. See Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004-2006) and What 
They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 528–29 (2007) (discussing how the use of 
remands over reversals damages veterans’ perceptions of the Veterans Court). 
 48. O’Reilly, supra note 45, at 248. 
 49. Allen, supra note 32, at 377. 
 50. See Allen, supra note 47, at 515–16. 
 51. 60 Minutes: Veterans’ Benefit Frustrations (CBS television broadcast Jan. 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6050247n. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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Veterans Court has not eliminated concerns about the quality of agency 
adjudication. 
Some of the complaints raised about the adjudication of veterans’ 
claims post-reform are strikingly similar to some of those currently 
raised about immigration adjudication pre-reform.  In both areas, 
concerns arise about whether the adjudication system incorporates too 
much rubber-stamping and too little meaningful independent review, 
about backlogs, and about the quality of the output of the system.  While 
these are different administrative systems, the experience of the Veterans 
Court should at least serve as a warning that administrative adjudication 
reform is more dynamic and intricate than it may seem. 
In fact, even the Article I Tax Court is not immune to charges of bias 
or incomplete independence.54  While sometimes cited as a model for 
immigration adjudication reform,55 it must be acknowledged that the Tax 
Court does have its critics.  Again, whether the Tax Court is actually 
biased or is not exercising true independence from the executive branch 
is not as important here as is recognizing that creation of a formally 
independent court alone does not necessarily eliminate concerns about 
adjudication.  Perhaps one source of (at least) perceived Tax Court bias 
is that the complexity of substantive tax law works in the government’s 
favor and against a pro se litigant.56  This illustrates that the reputation of 
administrative adjudication depends on more than its decisional 
independence. 
If creating a structure that allows for decisional independence is not a 
guaranteed fix, other factors must affect the state of an adjudication 
system.  Those other factors will vary from administrative system to 
administrative system.  This Article focuses on factors, beyond a lack of 
decisional independence, that detrimentally affect the immigration 
adjudication system.  A broader approach to reform that engages these 
other contributors will boost the chances of successful reform.  Any 
reform must consider all of the roadblocks to improved adjudication, in 
                                                     
 54. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the 
Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
985, 999–1000 (1991) (describing that a possible unconscious bias may exist among Tax Court 
judges); David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 17, 25–28 (responding to charges of pro-government Tax Court bias); Leandra Lederman, Tax 
Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 
1212 (2008) (discussing a perception of bias); James Edward Maule, Instant Replay, Weak Teams, 
and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66 TENN. L. REV. 351 
(1999) (evaluating allegations of Tax Court bias). 
 55. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 12, at 4, 15. 
 56. Laro, supra note 54, at 26–27. 
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addition to correcting problems presented by a lack of decisional 
independence. 
B. Other Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis 
What types of reforms, in addition to advances in decisional 
independence, are necessary to improve immigration adjudication?  Five 
additional problems contribute to the immigration adjudication crisis: 
substantive immigration law; the conflicting signals of immigration 
adjudication; the lack of de facto independence; the use of diversions 
from the system; and weakened judicial review.57 
1. Substantive Immigration Law: Harshness, Complexity, and Opacity 
Even if immigration adjudicators achieve decisional independence, 
the adjudication system would still be limited by the state of substantive 
immigration law.  Many of the problems with the immigration 
adjudication system can be traced back to the harshness, complexity, and 
opacity of substantive immigration law.58  Specifically, the state of the 
substantive law contributes to the huge backlogs in the system, the 
extreme lack of lawyers in the system, and immigration law’s esteem 
problem.59  A new structure, such as an Article I immigration court, may 
yield disappointing results if the issues plaguing substantive immigration 
law are transferred to the new venue.60 
                                                     
 57. There are well-documented inconsistencies in the adjudication of asylum cases.  See 
generally RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 25.  I do not address these inconsistencies because I 
view them as a byproduct of a troubled system (as are poor quality decisions), rather than as causes 
of the crisis.  The five problems discussed here are inputs rather than outputs. 
 58. The ABA Study acknowledges the link between substantive immigration law, including the 
way it is enforced, and the adjudication system.  See ABA STUDY, supra note 11, at ES-19 to -26.  
The Study dedicated a whole Part to the Department of Homeland Security which discusses how the 
severity of certain provisions—specifically the aggravated felony, crime of moral turpitude, 
unlawful presence, and detention provisions—and the lack of prosecutorial discretion create the need 
for more adjudication.  Id.  This Article similarly recognizes the interdependence between 
substantive law and the adjudication system but uncovers other evidence and manifestations of 
interdependence and presents a more focused analysis of the connections. 
 59. See infra Part III.B.1.d. 
 60. Others have acknowledged links between substantive immigration law and immigration 
adjudication.  See Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward 
Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 205–09 (2002) (uncovering “process borders” in 
adjudication that hinder those wishing to access the benefits afforded by substantive immigration 
law); Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the 
Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
37, 41–56, 64–68 (2006–2007) (pointing out the role of broad removability grounds, increased 
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Substantive immigration law is “complex, obtuse, and, at times, 
unintelligible.”61  This Section will describe the harshness, complexity, 
and opacity of immigration law.  With a better understanding of these 
qualities, this Section will then explicitly link these qualities to the 
immigration adjudication crisis. 
a. Harshness and Complexity: Inadmissibility and Deportability 
Grounds 
One main task of substantive immigration law is to establish 
categories of behavior or characteristics that will prevent an individual’s 
admission into the United States, result in an individual’s deportation 
from the United States, or both.  The inadmissibility and deportability 
grounds are broad, strict, confusing,62 and unforgiving.63  One 
inadmissibility ground and one deportability ground are discussed here to 
illustrate the harshness and complexity of substantive immigration law.  
These examples are typical of the severity and intricacy of immigration 
law. 
One inadmissibility ground denies legal entry to anyone “convicted 
of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts 
which constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation of (or a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the 
                                                                                                                       
enforcement, the limited availability of relief, the limits on judicial review, and the increased use of 
detention in contributing to the increase in the number of immigration cases in the federal courts) 
[hereinafter Benson, Making Paper Dolls]; David A. Martin, Mandel, Cheng Fan Kwok, and Other 
Unappealing Cases: The Next Frontier of Immigration Reform, 27 VA. J. INT’L L. 803, 805 (1987) 
(identifying the importance of the adjudication system in the potential success of substantive 
reforms); Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 621 (2006) 
(connecting the degree of discretion afforded by the substantive law to the complexity of 
adjudication); Brian G. Slocum, Courts vs. the Political Branches: Immigration “Reform” and the 
Battle for the Future of Immigration Law, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 526 (2007) (describing 
adjudication reform as “limited” and arguing that “[t]he most pressing injustices in immigration law 
stem from the extremely harsh substantive laws passed by Congress”); Leon Wildes, The Need for a 
Specialized Immigration Court: A Practical Response, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 57 (1980) 
(characterizing a proposal for structural reform as “a mere upgrading of the stature of immigration 
judges, with no assurance whatsoever that the alien will receive any tangible benefit”). 
 61. Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A 
Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1637 (2009). 
 62. Justice Alito has emphasized the intimidating task of determining whether a particular 
criminal offense renders someone deportable.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1489 (2010) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (referring to a “dizzying paragraph” in an immigration law guidebook that 
attempts to explain whether a particular offense renders someone deportable). 
 63. “While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad 
discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the 
class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences 
of deportation.”  Id. at 1478. 
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United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance.”64  
There are no exceptions, and there is no requirement of a conviction.65 
Two potential waivers may be available, but the availability of those 
waivers is extremely narrow.  One waiver, which is not the focus here, is 
only available to temporary visitors, and the authority to grant the waiver 
is left wholly to the discretion of the executive branch.66  The other 
waiver, which is the focus, applies to those seeking to be admitted as a 
lawful permanent resident (“green card” status).67  This lawful permanent 
resident waiver is extremely complex and is difficult to summarize.68 
                                                     
 64. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006) (emphasis added).  A conviction for immigration 
purposes includes a guilty plea.  Id. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i). 
 65. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). 
 66. Id. § 1182(d)(3)(A). 
 67. Id. § 1182(h). 
 68. To appreciate the type of statutory construction that is usual in immigration law, I reproduce 
the entire statutory section here.  At the very least, the immigration laws could benefit from a 
restyling effort. 
(h) Waiver of subsection (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (B), (D), and (E) 
  The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs 
(A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) of subsection (a)(2) of this section and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) 
of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 
grams or less of marijuana if— 
  (1)(A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney 
General that— 
  (i) the alien is inadmissible only under subparagraph (D)(i) or (D)(ii) of such 
subsection or the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 
years before the date of the alien’s application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of 
status, 
  (ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the 
national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and 
  (iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or 
  (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen 
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is 
established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien’s denial of admission 
would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, 
parent, son, or daughter of such alien; or 
  (C) the alien is a VAWA self-petitioner; and 
  (2) the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and 
procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien’s applying or 
reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status. 
No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of an alien who has been 
convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts that constitute) murder or criminal 
acts involving torture, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder or a criminal act 
involving torture.  No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien 
who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been 
convicted of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in 
the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of 
initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States.  No court shall have 
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under 
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Eligibility for this lawful permanent resident waiver begins with a 
relatively simple, but harsh, condition.  This waiver is only available to 
those inadmissible under the controlled substance ground, described 
above, whose violation consisted of “a single offense of simple 
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.”69  Any other type of drug 
violation renders the individual ineligible for the waiver, and thus, 
inadmissible. 
In the next step of the waiver analysis, the theme remains harsh, but 
also increases in complexity.  Even if an individual falls under the simple 
possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana category, the waiver is 
still not guaranteed.  The waiver is available only if (A) the violation 
occurred more than fifteen years before the application for admission, 
and the admission of the foreign national “would not be contrary to the 
national welfare, safety, or security of the United States,” and the foreign 
national “has been rehabilitated;” or (B) the foreign national is the 
spouse, parent, son or daughter of a United States citizen or a lawful 
permanent resident and the executive branch determines that the “denial 
of admission would result in extreme hardship” to the qualifying 
relative.70  But the statutory requirements do not end there.  Even if the 
individual can show that he or she meets (A) or (B) above, the issuance 
of the waiver is wholly within the discretion of the executive branch.71  
Also, even if the individual can show that he or she meets (A) or (B) 
above, the waiver is not available if the applicant was previously 
admitted72 in lawful permanent resident status and (1) has been convicted 
of an aggravated felony or (2) has not continuously resided in the United 
States for at least seven years.73 
Thus, the inadmissibility ground and its accompanying lawful 
permanent resident waiver are both harsh and complex.  The 
inadmissibility ground holds these qualities because it sweeps in any 
                                                                                                                       
this subsection. 
Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. § 1182(h)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).  There is a third possibility, (C), which applies if 
the applicant for the waiver is self-petitioning under the Violence Against Women Act.  Id.  
§ 1182(h)(1)(C). 
 71. Id. § 1182(h)(2).  
 72. Litigation over the use of the term admitted further illustrates the complexity of the law.  
The Fifth Circuit has concluded that use of the term admitted does not include those whose status 
was adjusted to lawful permanent residence at some point after an original admission under some 
other status.  Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 73. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2) (emphasis added) (following section 1182(h)(2), but without carrying 
its own numerical indicator).  The statute also bars against granting a waiver to anyone convicted of, 
or who has admitted committing, acts that constitute serious crimes, like murder.  Id. 
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drug violation, even if there was never a conviction.  The waiver holds 
these qualities because it only exists within the discretion of the 
executive, even if an applicant fits into its narrow reach (it is restricted 
only to possession of a small amount of marijuana) and can satisfy a 
labyrinth of conditions. 
While the text of this drug violation waiver is mind-boggling, the 
text of the aggravated felony deportability ground, in contrast, consists of 
one simple sentence.  It states that “any alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”74  This 
seeming simplicity is deceptive, however, because the statute contains an 
elaborate and intricate definition of the term aggravated felony.  This 
definition consists of a long list of broad categories of offenses that 
qualify, for immigration purposes, as an aggravated felony, no matter if 
the offense was aggravated or a felony.75 
The aggravated felony label is harsh, in part, because of the 
deception surrounding the label.  To label an individual an aggravated 
felon paints an ominous picture, when in reality the offense supporting 
the label could be relatively minor.  The ramifications of the deception 
magnify its harshness.  Once the label is attached, aggravated felons are 
not eligible for most forms of relief from removal,76 are subject to 
mandatory detention,77 and face a permanent bar to returning to the 
United States after removal.78  The provision is also harsh because it 
applies without time limit—the offense may occur at any time after 
admission, and the individual’s connections to the United States do not 
matter. 
The aggravated felony ground of deportability is also complex.  
Adjudicators expend much effort determining whether a conviction 
under a particular statute fits within the statutory definition of an 
aggravated felony.  For example, the statutory definition of an 
aggravated felony includes “a crime of violence,” as defined under other 
                                                     
 74. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 75. Id. § 1101(a)(43).  For example, a “drug trafficking crime” is an aggravated felony.  Id.  
§ 1101(a)(43)(B).  The government has argued that two state law misdemeanor possession offenses 
constitute a drug trafficking crime, but the Supreme Court disagreed.  Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 
130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589–90 (2010). 
 76. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (providing that an individual’s removal cannot be cancelled if 
he or she has “been convicted of any aggravated felony”); id. § 1229c(a)(1) (providing that an 
aggravated felon may not be permitted to depart the United States at his own expense in lieu of 
removal proceedings). 
 77. See id. § 1226(c)(1)(B). 
 78. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). 
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federal law.79  A crime of violence includes “an offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person or property of another.”80  Particular statutes of 
conviction must be compared against that definition to determine 
whether the statute of conviction encompasses the requisite mental state.  
In one thread of this type of inquiry, the Supreme Court ultimately 
determined that a DUI statute that requires either no mens rea or only a 
showing of negligence does not qualify as a crime of violence and thus 
cannot support the aggravated felony label.81 
Once a deportability ground attaches (for example, an offense is 
determined to be an aggravated felony), there is a narrow avenue of 
potential relief from deportation.  The narrowness of this relief also 
exhibits the harshness and complexity of immigration law.  A close look 
at the major form of relief from removal, called Cancellation of 
Removal, shows that it is very complex to apply, as well as harsh in that 
it sets the bar to relief high and provides little to no room to consider 
rehabilitation or other equitable considerations.82 
The statute permits cancellation under two main routes.  The first is 
for those individuals who have already achieved permanent resident 
status.  Under Cancellation of Removal part (a), an individual’s removal 
may be cancelled if (1) the individual has been “lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence for not less than 5 years,” (2) the individual “has 
resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been 
admitted in any status,” and (3) the individual “has not been convicted of 
any aggravated felony.”83  The second route to cancellation is open to 
both permanent residents who cannot meet the requirements of part (a) 
and to those without that status.  Under Cancellation of Removal part (b), 
an individual’s removal may be cancelled if (1) the individual “has been 
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less 
than 10 years,” (2) the individual “has been a person of good moral 
character during such period,” (3) the individual has not been convicted 
of certain crimes, and (4) the individual “establishes that removal would 
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the individual’s 
spouse, parent, or child, but only if that qualifying relative is a citizen of 
the United States or is a lawful permanent resident of the United States.84 
                                                     
 79. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F). 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). 
 81. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). 
 82. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. 
 83. Id. § 1229b(a). 
 84. Id. § 1229b(b)(1). 
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Cancellation of Removal is complex to apply because, as is usual in 
immigration law, there is information external to the main statutory 
section that dramatically affects its meaning.  For example, both 
continuous residence and continuous physical presence are defined 
elsewhere in the statute.85  To calculate either continuous residence or 
continuous physical presence, the statute defines that any period 
artificially ends on the earlier date of either when removal proceedings 
begin or when the individual commits a listed criminal offense.86  The 
statute further reveals that a break in continuous physical presence occurs 
if an individual leaves the United States for any one period greater than 
90 days or “for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.”87  If an 
individual has actually resided in the United States for seven years but 
his or her removal proceedings began during his or her sixth year of 
residence, that individual has not “resided in the United States 
continuously for 7 years,” according to the statute.  Also, an individual 
who has resided in the United States for 11 years but once visited his or 
her parents in a foreign country for 91 days has not “been physically 
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 
years.” 
The relief scheme is also complex to apply because it incorporates 
two difficult immigration law concepts: “good moral character” and 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”  These concepts require a 
close reading of past adjudications to provide an informed prediction of 
whether either standard is met.88  While the statute does include a list of 
characteristics that render someone not a person of “good moral 
character,” the list is not exclusive.89 
Cancellation of Removal is harsh because the statutory requirements 
set a high bar to achieve relief.  The statutory requirements narrow the 
potential applicability of relief.  If an individual cannot meet the many 
prerequisites, time-based and otherwise, then this form of relief simply is 
not available.  For example, all individuals convicted of aggravated 
felonies are locked out of Cancellation of Removal.90  Also, the statutory 
requirements are rigid.  The statute does not allow room for adjudicators 
                                                     
 85. See id. § 1229b(d). 
 86. See id. § 1229b(d)(1). 
 87. Id. § 1229b(d)(2). 
 88. See, e.g., Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60–62 (B.I.A. 2001) (describing the 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard as not as high as unconscionable but higher 
than extreme hardship). 
 89. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f). 
 90. See id. § 1229b(a)(3). 
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to consider rehabilitation of the foreign national, nor are other equitable 
considerations ripe for consideration other than a showing of exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship to a narrow group of qualifying 
relatives.91 
Compounding the complexity and the harshness is that, even if all of 
the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, the granting of this form of relief 
is discretionary.  From the foreign national’s perspective, immigration 
judges do not have positive discretion in the sense that the statute does 
not permit those adjudicators to look at or weigh the totality of 
circumstances in an individual’s case to the individual’s potential benefit.  
The statute does grant immigration judges negative discretion, however, 
to deny relief even if the foreign national does meet all of the statutory 
prerequisites.92  Furthermore, this negative discretion is not subject to 
judicial review.93 
To close out this discussion of the inadmissibility and deportability 
grounds, it is important to note that the substantive law often provides no 
statute of limitations on immigration violations.94  For example, there is 
no statute of limitations on removability based on an aggravated felony 
conviction.95  Therefore, the adjudication system is called on to 
adjudicate cases where the offense that creates removability occurred 
many years before.96 
b. Harshness: Other Examples 
Additionally, the dismantled boundaries between civil immigration 
law, criminal law, and national security law, large increases in  
                                                     
 91. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). 
 92. See id. § 1229b(a); 1229b(b)(1). 
 93. See id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 94. Within the criminal-related deportability grounds listed in § 1227(a)(2), only the ground of 
“crimes of moral turpitude” contains a time limitation.  See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (establishing a 
deportability ground triggered by a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude committed within five 
years after admission). 
 95. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any 
time after admission is deportable.”) (emphasis added). 
 96. For example, a business executive who left his native China at age five found himself in 
removal proceedings as an adult.  Nina Bernstein, For a Pardoned Detainee, Released but Not Told 
Why, a Lonely, Happy Trip Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A27.  He had participated in a 
series of muggings as a teenager but had turned his life around.  Id.  Many years later, his application 
for citizenship drew attention to his criminal history.  Id.  Because his convictions qualified as 
aggravated felonies, he was not eligible to seek any relief from removal.  See id.  His only recourse 
was to petition the governor to pardon him for his earlier crimes.  Id. 
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enforcement efforts, the absence of proportionality, and the increased use 
of detention reveal the harshness of substantive immigration law. 
Immigration law is harsh because of the dismantled boundaries 
between civil immigration law, criminal law, and national security law.97  
Enforcement officials have made clear their position that immigration 
law is a crime issue and a national security issue.98  A characterization of 
immigration law as criminal law and national security law has resulted in 
an atmosphere of “zero-tolerance” among immigration enforcement  
                                                     
 97. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime 
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1831–32 (2007) (arguing that the blurring of 
boundaries between immigration control, crime control, and national security have created 
consequences that neither achieve national security nor accomplish immigration policy goals); Kevin 
R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate Over Immigration Reform by 
Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 
CHAP. L. REV. 583, 586–87 (2010) (arguing that immigration is primarily about the migration of 
people to the United States for jobs rather than drugs or terrorism); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard 
Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North 
American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1373 (2007) (arguing that national security concerns 
have inappropriately dominated the debate over comprehensive immigration reform). 
 98. Immigration and Customs Enforcement describes its mission as “[t]o promote homeland 
security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing 
border control, customs, trade, and immigration.”  ICE Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).  The Office of 
Homeland Security Investigations within ICE describes its mission as “[t]o conduct criminal 
investigations that protect the United States against terrorist and other criminal organizations who 
threaten our safety and national security.”  ICE Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/homeland-security-
investigations/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).  Further, the Office of Investigations describes its 
immigration worksite enforcement efforts as playing “an important role in the fight against illegal 
immigration.”  Worksite Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/worksite/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).  The Office of Detention and Removal 
Management describes itself as “defend[ing] public safety and national security.”  Detention & 
Removal Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov 
/about/offices/enforcement-removal-operations/drm/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
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officials.99  This colors every removal as a win for the protection of 
Americans. 
This characterization of immigration law dovetails with recent large 
increases in immigration enforcement efforts.  The Department of 
Homeland Security reported that in fiscal year 2008, it reached its sixth 
consecutive record high for removals, with almost 359,000 individuals 
removed.100  In 2001, by comparison, the government removed a little 
more than half of the 2008 total.101 
Another example of the harshness of immigration law is its lack of 
proportionality.102  As Professor Juliet Stumpf has observed, removal 
from the United States “is the ubiquitous penalty for any immigration 
violation.”103  Removal is an “on-off switch,” which leaves no room for 
gradations of punishment dependant on the circumstances of the 
violation.104  Especially as relief from removal has become increasingly 
out of reach and devoid of proportionality itself, the system metes out 
one punishment, and one punishment only, no matter the 
circumstances.105  Removal is a harsh punishment, as it forces relocation 
and limits basic life choices such as living with close family members. 
A final example of the harshness of immigration law is that it 
requires detention in many removal cases.106  Immigration and Customs 
                                                     
 99. See APPLESEED, supra note 25, at 16–17 (discussing a zero-tolerance mentality among ICE 
attorneys).  On his blog, one immigration lawyer has recounted a client’s encounter with 
immigration officials that illustrates this zero-tolerance attitude.  Carl Shusterman, Freeing a Family 
from CBP Custody: A Lawyer’s Perspective, NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (Feb. 14, 2010, 10:48 AM), 
http://shusterman.typepad.com/nation-of-immigrants/2010/02/an-illegal-checkpoint-stop-a-lawyers-
perspective.html.  His client, a registered nurse, had legal permission to be in the United States.  Id.  
She was stopped, with her family, at an interior checkpoint in California.  Id.  Through a series of 
misunderstandings of some complicated immigration law concepts, immigration officials took the 
erroneous position that the nurse and her family should be detained.  Id.  The lawyer tried to explain 
the mistake to a government supervisor.  Id.  The supervisor told the lawyer that while the lawyer 
may be correct about the law, “we have to do what we have to do, and we will let the Immigration 
Judge decide what to do with your clients.”  Id.  The attorney eventually did secure the release of the 
family without a hearing before an immigration judge, but the story is emblematic of the zero-
tolerance attitude and how that attitude can create more immigration litigation.  Id. 
 100. DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008, 
at 1 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement 
_ar_08.pdf. 
 101. Id. at 4 tbl.2. 
 102. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2009). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1690–91.  The on-off switch may be an effort to interject simplicity into the law, but 
the simplicity is misplaced.  In the case of proportionality, simplicity leads to harshness. 
 105. See id. at 1693–1704. 
 106. See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing 
Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, a Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 542 (2009). 
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Enforcement (ICE) is setting detention records.107  In fiscal year 2008, 
ICE detained 378,582 individuals, which was a twenty-two percent 
increase from the year before.108  Immigration detention is almost 
indiscernible from criminal detention, but the immigration violation is a 
civil offense.109  The detention can take place in a prison that also houses 
criminal offenders.110  Even facilities reserved exclusively for 
immigration detainees have notorious reputations.111 
c. Opacity 
Immigration law is opaque because it is difficult for even seasoned 
practitioners to predict outcomes.  The penalty choice is clear—either 
removal or no removal—but the path that leads to that end point is 
notoriously difficult to navigate.  While no area of law is completely 
transparent, immigration law is detrimentally elusive.112  There are three 
main causes of this feature.  One is the complexity of the law itself.  The 
second is the tremendous role of discretion in applying substantive 
immigration law.113  The third is the prolific use of nonregulatory 
administrative tools, such as individual adjudication decisions or policy 
memoranda, to govern how the agency should interpret the substantive 
law.114 
                                                     
 107. DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 100, at 3. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 489–94 (2007). 
 110. See Nina Bernstein, Sick Detainees Complicate Plans to Close Immigration Jail, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, at A18 (noting that immigration authorities rent cells in county jails). 
 111. See, e.g., id. (describing the overcrowded and poor conditions of the Varick Facility in New 
York).  See generally Markowitz, supra note 106, at 552–54 (providing an overview of the Varick 
Facility). 
 112. Professor Colin Diver analyzed the precision of the adjustment of status regulations and 
found those regulations to be flawed.  Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative 
Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 80 (1983).  Professor Diver described the standardless discretion involved in 
the adjustment decision and argued that the transaction costs of such standardless discretion are 
substantial.  Id. at 93–95. 
 113. Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have argued that the executive branch’s 
discretion consists of even more than that expressly delegated by Congress.  Adam B. Cox & 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 475 (2009).  The 
executive branch also holds a great deal of de facto delegated power through its prosecutorial 
discretion function.  See id. at 464.  The vastness of the prosecutorial discretion function contributes 
to the opacity of immigration law, as it is unclear to a large population of individuals if they will 
even be subject to removal proceedings. 
 114. See Neuman, supra note 60, at 623–24 (“Discretion delegated by statute can also be 
exercised through reasonably designed regulations that identify categories of cases in which relief is 
warranted or unwarranted.  It is well known, however, that the immigration authorities have been 
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The aggravated felony deportability ground is an example of how the 
complexity of the law makes it hard to predict outcomes.  Justice Alito 
has discussed how it is difficult for attorneys to predict whether a 
particular offense is an aggravated felony.115  It is a difficult task, and 
even deciphering the practice of one court of appeals can be intense and 
unsatisfying.  Similarly, the study of the Cancellation of Removal relief 
provision reveals several complex points where outcomes become 
difficult to predict, such as whether someone is a person of good moral 
character or whether there is exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship.116 
The drug inadmissibility waiver also reveals how immigration law is 
opaque.  The waiver is opaque because, just as with Cancellation of 
Removal, the decision to grant the waiver, no matter if the applicant 
jumps through every statutory hoop, is left to the undefined discretion of 
the executive branch.117  There is no direction to the executive branch on 
how to exercise this discretion.  Additionally, the section eliminates 
judicial review of the decision whether to grant the waiver.118  To predict 
whether an individual will be granted a waiver, attorneys must rely on 
experience or networked advice.119  There is little statutory or regulatory 
guidance.120  This makes immigration law especially opaque to anyone 
new to immigration law, including foreign nationals. 
The waiver is also opaque in that additional administrative guidance 
exists mainly through opinions produced in individual adjudications.  For 
example, while the waiver is directed toward those applying for 
admission as a lawful permanent resident, the statute instructs that if the 
                                                                                                                       
extremely reluctant to narrow their discretion to deny relief by regulation.”). 
 115. See supra note 62. 
 116. See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., Goldeshtein, 20 I. & N. Dec. 382, 387–88 (B.I.A. 1991) (affirming decision of an 
immigration judge to deny a waiver despite that the applicant may have proved extreme hardship), 
rev’d on other grounds, Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. 
 118. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 119. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., § 212(h) ELIGIBILITY: CASE LAW AND 
POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS (2008), available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/pa/212elig.pdf (practice 
advisory for attorneys addressing § 212(h) statutory eligibility). 
 120. By regulation, the executive branch has indicated that it usually will not grant such waivers 
where the underlying violation involved a violent or dangerous crime.  8 C.F.R. § 1212.7(d) (2010).  
That regulation provides some guidance but does not address violations that do not involve a violent 
or dangerous crime.  Also, the regulation is vague even with respect to violent or dangerous crimes.  
The regulation states: “The [executive], in general, will not favorably exercise discretion under 
section 212(h)(2) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(h)(2)) . . . in cases involving violent or dangerous 
crimes, except in extraordinary circumstances. . . . Moreover, depending on the gravity of the alien’s 
underlying criminal offense, a showing of extraordinary circumstances might still be 
insufficient . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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applicant for the waiver is someone who was previously admitted in that 
status, and lost it, certain restrictions apply.121  What about the waiver 
applicant who has never held lawful permanent resident status?  Do those 
restrictions apply to him or her as well?  If not, that would put someone 
who has never been a lawful permanent resident on stronger footing than 
someone who previously held that close connection to the United States.  
The answer to the question comes not from a regulation, but rather from 
an individual adjudication.122  Also, the waiver statute sets an “extreme 
hardship” standard.123  The meaning of that standard is found through 
synthesizing the results of individual adjudications; the standard is 
intensely case-specific.124 
d. The Links Between the Adjudication System and the Harshness, 
Complexity, and Opacity of Immigration Law 
The harshness, complexity, and opacity of immigration law impact 
the adjudication system and must be considered when reforming the 
system.  The harshness and complexity create the need for more 
adjudication.125  The harshness, complexity, and opacity together 
contribute to immigration law’s lack-of-representation problem and to its 
esteem problem. 
                                                     
 121. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Michel, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1101, 1104–05 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that an individual who 
did not previously hold lawful permanent resident status is eligible for a 212(h) waiver, despite that 
the individual fell under a waiver exclusion applicable to those with previous lawful permanent 
resident status). 
 123. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 124. See, e.g., Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 560, 565–68 (B.I.A. 1999) (addressing the 
extreme hardship standard). 
 125. Others have more generally examined how the nature of a substantive rule affects 
adjudication under that rule.  For example, Professor Colin Diver has argued that an opaque 
administrative rule increases the cost of applying that rule and that transparent rules allow for more 
predictability, which in turn lessens the amount of litigation.  See Diver, supra note 112, at 73–74.  
In immigration law, concern about transparency must be balanced against other factors that also 
influence the quality of immigration adjudication.  For example, transparent rules that do not 
incorporate space to consider proportionality or rehabilitation will still leave foreign nationals with a 
strong incentive to access adjudication. 
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i. Caseloads 
Immigration judge caseloads continue to climb to record levels.126  In 
fiscal year 2009, approximately 230 immigration judges completed 
290,233 proceedings.127  Proceedings are more intensive hearings and do 
not include bond hearings and other motions—thus this number does not 
represent total workload.128  Proceedings alone average over 1200 per 
year per judge.  Despite this frenetic pace, a backlog of cases continues 
to build.  In September 2010, 261,083 cases were pending before the 
immigration courts.129  This backlog is forty percent higher than the 
backlog two years before.130  The average wait time for a case before an 
immigration judge is 456 days.131  Despite these daunting and growing 
caseloads, immigration judge hiring has been slow, and immigration 
judges on the bench lack adequate training and other in-house resources, 
like law clerks.132 
The harshness and complexity of the substantive law creates the need 
for more adjudication.  The substantive law accomplishes this in three 
main ways.  First, the substantive law drives the docket.  The 
inadmissibility and deportability grounds are now extremely broad and 
unforgiving.133  As the grounds widen, more individuals will be 
removable from the United States.  In turn, that signals a need for more 
adjudication as each charge of removability carries the possibility of a 
challenge to the charge through adjudication.134  Any reform to the 
system must realistically consider the load placed on the system by the 
substantive law.  Also, reform should consider the complexity of the 
adjudication once it begins.  What relief from removal is available is 
                                                     
 126. See Transactional Records Access Clearing House, As FY 2010 Ends, Immigration Case 
Backlog Still Growing (Oct. 21, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/242/. 
 127. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Number of Immigration Judges, 1998–2009, 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/225/include/payroll.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011); EXEC. 
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK B7 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf. 
 128. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 127, at B7. 
 129. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra note 126. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Family, supra note 4, at 600–01; Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, supra 
note 127. 
 133. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 134. See Edward R. Grant, Laws of Intended Consequences: IIRIRA and Other Unsung 
Contributors to the Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 963 (2006) 
(acknowledging that the work of immigration adjudicators is fed by substantive policy choices). 
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buried in a thicket that requires a well-seasoned lawyer to cut through.  
The complexity of the law leads to more complicated adjudications. 
Second, the way the substantive law is enforced also drives the 
docket.  Zero-tolerance policies and large increases in enforcement create 
the need for more adjudication.  The harsh zero-tolerance attitude, and its 
corresponding lack of prosecutorial discretion, pushes more cases into 
the adjudication system.135  Once these cases enter the system, a natural 
inclination is to attempt to access relief from removal.  To access relief, 
adjudication is necessary. 
Third, the harsh lack of proportionality may increase the need for 
adjudication.  Because only extreme outcomes to a removal hearing are 
available (either removal or no removal), the stakes are high enough to 
motivate adjudication.  If a scheme of more proportional punishment 
existed for certain classes of foreign nationals—such as fines—those 
charged with those violations might be less inclined to challenge the 
charge through adjudication.136  For example, a new relief scheme could 
be created where long-term legal permanent residents convicted of minor 
crimes could be subjected to a civil fine as punishment for violating the 
immigration laws due to the conviction, rather than being subject to 
removal.  If a long-term resident knows that the potential ultimate 
penalty is a fine, and not removal, that individual may be more inclined 
to pay the fine than to challenge the charge through adjudication. 
The President of the National Association of Immigration Judges has 
described immigration court hearings as “‘like holding death penalty 
cases in traffic court.’”137  This description encapsulates the complicated 
relationship between the substantive law and the adjudication system 
illustrated here.  The broad nature of the substantive law, and the way 
that it is enforced, creates the need for a high volume adjudication 
system.  But the substantive law is so complex and so harsh that 
immigration judges are called on to apply law that cries out for the 
resources of a low volume system. 
                                                     
 135. An effort to exercise prosecutorial discretion and remove some cases from the system may 
be underway.  See Susan Carroll, Feds Moving to Dismiss Some Deportation Cases, HOUS. CHRON., 
Aug. 25, 2010, at A1.  See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010) (discussing immigration 
prosecutorial discretion). 
 136. Professor Stumpf has more fully discussed potential alternative penalties.  Stumpf, supra 
note 102, at 1737–40.  This Article is focused on how the harshness of the potential penalty may 
affect adjudication. 
 137. Julia Preston, Lawyers Back Creating New Immigration Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, 
at A14. 
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If the penalty for speeding became automatic loss of the driver’s 
license (or worse), then surely more individuals would appear in traffic 
court to contest their guilt.  Because the penalty is usually just a fine, the 
incentive to appear in traffic court is lower than if the penalty were 
harsher.  An increase in the harshness of the substantive law would cause 
an increase in volume in traffic court, which would, in turn, challenge the 
ability of the traffic court to function.  Similarly, if the inquiry to 
determine whether someone should lose their license under the new 
regime became as complex as immigration law, the increased time 
necessary to adjudicate each case would put greater pressure on the 
traffic court’s ability to manage its caseload. 
A study of high volume administrative systems described the 
following characteristics of a high volume system: “a need for short 
hearing time (typically one hour or less for most high-volume 
categories), quick decisional response, high judge productivity (30 or 
more written decisions per month per judge) and docketing/scheduling 
practices capable of efficiently handling . . . endless lines of short 
causes.”138  These characteristics are simply a mismatch to the 
adjudication needs created by substantive immigration law. 
Thus, the effect of the substantive law on the volume of cases is a 
key factor in designing a complementary adjudication system, including 
the design of immigration adjudication reform.  A solution may be to 
increase the capacity and resources of the court to allow it to handle the 
docket.  Another possibility is to reform the substantive law, making it 
less harsh and less complex so that the substantive law matches the needs 
of a high volume system.  Decisional independence alone, however, will 
not address the caseload crisis. 
ii. Representation 
Compounding caseload troubles is a lack of quality legal 
representation for foreign nationals in immigration court.  In fiscal year 
2009, sixty-one percent of respondents in immigration court did not have 
attorney representation.139  Of those detained during their civil 
immigration hearing, less than twenty percent appeared with an 
attorney.140  There are also serious concerns about the quality of 
                                                     
 138. Daniel L. Skoler, The Many Faces of High-Volume Administrative Adjudication: Structure, 
Organization and Management, 16 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 43, 47 (1996). 
 139. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 127, at G1. 
 140. NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING 
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representation provided by some attorneys and about the unauthorized 
practice of immigration law.141  The substantive law not only affects 
caseloads but also impacts immigration adjudication because it 
contributes to the extreme lack of lawyers in the system.142  The 
complexity, harshness, and opacity of immigration law contribute to and 
illustrate the significance of this extreme lack of representation. 
Why is it significant that so many foreign nationals appear in 
immigration court without representation?  The complexity, harshness, 
and opacity of immigration law dictate that individuals appearing pro se 
are at a huge disadvantage.143  The complicated patchwork of difficult 
statutes and nonregulatory adjudicatory tools effectively cuts off foreign 
nationals from participating in their own removal proceedings.144  The 
complicated waiver provision and the Cancellation of Removal 
provisions described above are just two examples of the complexity that 
lies behind the deceptively simple concept of relief from removal.145  If a 
noncitizen wants to argue that he or she is entitled to relief from removal, 
the argument must be made in conformity with statutes that challenge 
law students (and even lawyers and law professors).  Without guidance 
from an attorney, individuals in removal proceedings are at the mercy of 
immigration judges and immigration prosecutors to identify and evaluate 
any possible relief from removal.146  The aggravated felony removal 
ground is so intricate that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to 
                                                                                                                       
JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAM 1 
(2008), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=1780/LOP%2BEvaluation_May2008_ 
final.pdf. 
 141. Family, supra note 4, at 604. 
 142. The ABA Study recognized the lack of representation as a challenge to the functioning of 
the adjudication system.  ABA STUDY, supra note 11, at ES-39 to -42.  It does not, however, 
recognize how the substantive law itself contributes to the lack of representation problem. 
 143. See Jennifer L. Colyer et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant 
Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 461, 463 (2009) (describing the vulnerabilities of those subject to 
immigration court proceedings, including a lack of “money, substantial education, or language 
skills”); Johnson, supra note 61, at 1637–38 (discussing the incomprehensibility of immigration law 
to laypeople); Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications 
Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 58 (2008) (“Evidence shows that 
unrepresented cases are less likely to be successful.”). 
 144. According to one study, 39.2% of immigration detainees had possible meritorious claims 
for relief, but almost all of the detainees were unfamiliar with the relief provisions.  CITY BAR 
JUSTICE CTR., NYC KNOW YOUR RIGHTS PROJECT: AN INNOVATIVE PRO BONO RESPONSE TO THE 
LACK OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT IMMIGRANT DETAINEES 2, 14 (2009). 
 145. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 146. See Colyer et al., supra note 143, at 464 (“The government will be on one side with its 
awesome power, extensive institutional experience, and sophisticated understanding of the law.  An 
immigration judge will be presiding, who might be sympathetic to the immigrant’s story, but who 
would benefit from an adversarial presentation.  And the immigrant will often be standing all 
alone . . . .”). 
FAMILY FINAL 3/16/2011  1:22:04 PM 
568 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
hear many complex arguments surrounding its application.147  Given the 
zero-tolerance attitude of immigration enforcement officials and the 
caseload management pressures placed on immigration judges, it is 
highly questionable whether the interests of the unrepresented noncitizen 
are accounted for in immigration court.  To truly fight an immigration 
charge, the noncitizen needs a lawyer. 
To adjudicate a removal case effectively, the system also needs 
lawyers.  Because of the complexity of immigration law, pro se 
representation makes the job of the immigration judge even more 
difficult.  Without an attorney, if the immigration judge is concerned 
about the lack of representation, the immigration judge will need to 
perform the role of the missing lawyer.  The immigration judge will need 
to explain the complexities of immigration law to the individual and will 
need to conduct a detailed factual inquiry to determine eligibility for 
relief. 
The complexity and opacity of immigration law discourage attorney 
representation because those characteristics make it difficult to only 
occasionally practice immigration law.148  Because of the complexity of 
immigration law149 and because the law itself simply can be so difficult 
to locate,150 the substantive law creates a high barrier to entry.  This 
discourages attorneys in other practice areas to take on immigration 
cases, whether paid or pro bono.  Thus, the substantive law itself is a 
barrier to the provision of pro bono services and keeps the pool of 
available attorneys small. 
The harshness of immigration law contributes to the representation 
problem because it builds on a negative stereotype of foreign nationals in 
removal proceedings and because the increased use of detention deters 
                                                     
 147. See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010); Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 
1 (2004). 
 148. There are other causes that discourage attorney representation.  See Markowitz, supra note 
106, at 546–51, 556–63. 
 149. A subcommittee of the Study Group on Immigration Representation questioned lawyers in 
New York City about their experiences in immigration cases.  Colyer et al., supra note 143, at 469–
70.  The subcommittee reported that “[i]ssues heard over and over were lack of internal expertise in 
immigration law at the firm.”  Id. at 471.  The respondents also cited the difficulties in training 
attorneys to take on immigration cases as a barrier to representation.  Id.  Whether an attorney is 
willing to become competent in immigration law is a factor in determining the future of immigration 
representation.  Id. at 476. 
 150. Accessibility would improve if the immigration agencies issued more regulations, rather 
than relying on individual adjudications or subregulatory guidance.  For example, Professor Daniel 
Kanstroom has called for the issuance of more regulations to govern exercises of discretion.  Daniel 
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration 
Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 804–06 (1997). 
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representation.  The government’s efforts to brand the removal process 
as a tool to protect Americans from crime and national security threats 
may cause some attorneys to think twice before engaging in 
representation.  Furthermore, the increased use of detention, a harsh 
aspect of the substantive law, can serve as a deterrent to 
representation.151  Detention makes representation more difficult, 
especially because the government is well known to execute sudden and 
inexplicable transfers of immigrant detainees.152  A lawyer cannot be 
sure that his or her client will be in the same facility tomorrow.  In fact, 
the government may transfer the client across the country, and the lawyer 
may need to spend significant resources merely to locate the client.153  
Thus, the harshness of the substantive law demands an incredibly high 
level of stamina and requires an attorney willing to take on an unpopular 
cause. 
The lack of attorney representation leaves foreign nationals at a huge 
disadvantage, but it also hinders the ability of the system to progress.  
Creating more independent adjudicators would not resolve all of the 
issues surrounding why the representation rate is so low.  For example, 
creating more independent adjudicators would not make it any easier for 
attorneys only occasionally to practice immigration law. 
iii. Esteem 
Immigration law’s esteem problem also contributes to the existence 
of only a small pool of available attorneys who possess the necessary 
expertise, sophistication, and stamina.  Immigration law has an esteem 
problem because it is sometimes perceived as an outlier among, and 
inferior to, other areas of law,154 including administrative law.155  The 
                                                     
 151. See Colyer et al., supra note 143, at 470 (describing a study in which some firms indicated 
they were deterred from representing detainees because of the risk of transfer); Markowitz, supra 
note 106, at 556–60 (indicating the same conclusion based on interviews conducted by the author). 
 152. Markowitz, supra note 106, at 556–57. 
 153. Id. at 557. 
 154. See Leslie C. Levin, Guardians at the Gate: The Backgrounds, Career Paths, and 
Professional Development of Private US Immigration Lawyers, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 399, 400 
(2009).  In fact, even among immigration lawyers, representation of individuals in removal hearings 
is perceived as an unprestigious type of immigration law practice.  See id. at 412–14. 
 155. See Kevin R. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons About Immigrants in the Administrative 
State, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 11, 18 (2008) (“[I]mmigration law—although administered and enforced 
through a complex and powerful administrative bureaucracy—is considered to be a specialty area 
outside the mainstream of administrative law or U.S. law generally.”); Margaret H. Taylor, 
Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 
CONN. L. REV. 1647, 1653–54 (1997) (addressing an impression “that immigration law is too 
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immigration agencies themselves, including administrative adjudicators, 
are often the subject of criticism.156  The complexity of immigration law 
is notorious.157  Even the quality of some immigration lawyers is 
questioned, and the unauthorized practice of immigration law is 
prevalent.158  Compounding the esteem problem is that immigration law 
is an isolated area of law where usual legal conventions do not apply.159 
While there are many excellent immigration law practitioners who 
find their work extremely rewarding, the lack of representation in 
immigration court may also be due to a negative mystique attached to 
immigration law.  Due to its isolated status, its complexity, and the 
struggling reputations of the immigration agencies and attorneys, 
immigration law can seem to be a fortress.  It is filled with laws and 
procedures so complex, so harsh, so technical, and so exasperating that 
those who do enter the realm tend to stick together.160  Conquering the 
complexity and harshness takes so much time and energy that 
connections to the outside legal world are too few and far between.  This 
lack of connections only compounds the negative mystique of 
immigration law. 
                                                                                                                       
specialized to be a useful field of inquiry for those who are not tutored in its complexities”).  In some 
ways, the outlier status of immigration law is similar to the status of tax law.  For a discussion of the 
isolation of tax law, see Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to 
Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994). 
 156. See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005) (“This tension 
between judicial and administrative adjudicators is not due to judicial hostility to the nation’s 
immigration policies or to a misconception of the proper standard of judicial review of 
administrative decisions.  It is due to the fact that the adjudication of these cases at the administrative 
level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”); see also MILTON D. MORRIS, 
IMMIGRATION—THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY 87–133 (1985) (examining common reasons for 
the criticism of immigration agencies); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, 
Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 
1205–09 (describing areas in which immigration agencies have faced criticism); David A. Martin, 
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 
1267 n.59 (1990) (noting the low esteem of immigration agencies). 
 157. See, e.g., Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 2003) (“This case vividly illustrates the 
labyrinthine character of modern immigration law—a maze of hyper-technical statutes and 
regulations that engender waste, delay, and confusion for the Government and petitioners alike.”). 
 158. See Markowitz, supra note 106, at 543–44, 562; Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigration 
Legal Service Providers: Inadequate Representation and Notario Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 
584–86 (2009). 
 159. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1984) (“Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in our public law.  Probably no other 
area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental norms of 
constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate the rest of our legal 
system.”); see also Stacy Caplow, ReNorming Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 94–95 (2008) 
(discussing the lack of rules of evidence in immigration adjudication); Johnson, supra note 61, at 
1622 (stating that “U.S. immigration laws deviate dramatically from other areas of American law”). 
 160. For more on the community of immigration lawyers, see Levin, supra note 154, at 429–32. 
FAMILY FINAL 3/16/2011  1:22:04 PM 
2011] BEYOND DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE 571 
This esteem problem has repercussions both for quality 
representation and for high-class administrative judging.  The esteem 
problem can deter a quality lawyer from practicing immigration law and 
thus is another contributor to the lack-of-representation problem.  
Practicing immigration law requires an intense fighting spirit and an 
understanding that both the substantive law and the attitude of 
enforcement officers are heavily stacked against the client, and that there 
is little to no room for compromise.  Also, the high level of unreviewable 
discretion delegated to executive immigration officials makes it difficult 
for an attorney to predict outcomes to clients.161  Additionally, the 
reputation of the immigration law bar as a whole risks damage from 
shoddy representation by some lawyers and by those engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law.162  Finally, the characterization of 
immigration law as criminal and national security law clouds the 
reputation of the field.  It can be discouraging to represent someone who 
the lawyer knows has a minimal chance of success or to lead a client 
through a dysfunctional, unpredictable, and unpopular system.  The 
reputation of the system is poor, and some attorneys may not want to 
associate themselves with such a system. 
The esteem problem also hinders administrative judging because it 
reflects a diminished stature for administrative immigration adjudicators.  
The harshness of the substantive law often does not allow adjudicators to 
judge.  Limited relief provisions and the lack of proportionality all tie the 
hands of immigration adjudicators.  The nature of immigration law is 
stifling the deliberative aspect of being an adjudicator.  While there is 
some room for deliberation, such as deciding whether the “exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship” standard is met, the parameters of that 
discretion are very narrow.  Also, while negative discretion is built into 
the system, such as when an immigration judge has discretion to deny 
relief even if all of the statutory parameters are met, this discretion is 
restrained because it is focused in one direction—denial.  Thus, the law 
sends a signal that an adjudicator is only needed to robotically apply laws 
                                                     
 161. One immigration attorney noted that immigration agency policies are “as reliable and 
ephemeral as the inducements of a carnival barker.”  Angelo Paparelli, An Immigration Signature 
Story Yet Untold: How Far a Modern Quill Doth Come Too Short, ANGELO PAPARELLI ON 
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT (February 5, 2010, 12:49 AM), http://blogs.ilw.com/ 
angelopaparelli/2010/02/signature.html (describing the changing agency policy over who can sign an 
immigration form).  Professor Regina Germain has highlighted that immigration adjudication has no 
procedural rules.  Regina Germain, Putting the “Form” in Immigration Court Reform, 84 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2007). 
 162. See Markowitz, supra note 106, at 543–44, 562. 
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that leave little room for judgment.163  The nature of the position may 
affect the applicant pool. 
The creation of more independent immigration adjudicators could 
positively affect immigration law’s esteem problem.  The job security 
and prestige of an Article I position, for example, may attract higher 
quality adjudicators.  Those adjudicators and the attorneys who appear 
before them, however, would still need to apply the same deflating 
substantive law. 
*** 
This discussion reveals that the state of substantive immigration law 
is linked to the health of the adjudication system designed to apply it.  
The harshness and complexity of the substantive law lead to the need for 
more adjudication.  The harshness, complexity, and opacity together 
contribute to immigration law’s representation and esteem problems.  
While decisional independence is important, that independence will not 
be as meaningful if the newly independent adjudicators still face 
crushing caseloads, if still not enough lawyers participate in the system, 
and if the esteem problem continues to frustrate quality adjudication. 
2. The Conflicting Signals of Immigration Adjudication 
What is the purpose of immigration adjudication?  Resolution of this 
question would improve immigration adjudication.  Quality adjudication 
depends on a clear sense of purpose, and the participants in the system—
as well as the public—should understand the mission of the adjudication 
system. 
The system currently sends conflicting signals about its purpose.  In 
three main ways, the functioning of the system undercuts its appearance 
as a civil adjudicatory system staffed by “judges” who will review 
agency activities.  The first conflicting signal relates to decisional 
independence.  Through its history, the system has become more formal, 
and separation of functions has increased, but as described above, the 
system still lacks decisional independence.  A second set of conflicting 
signals is found through contrasting the increase in separation of 
                                                     
 163. One criticism of specialized courts is that their narrow jurisdiction increases “the danger of 
making the job repetitive and unattractive or of low prestige.”  David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, 
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 73 (1975).  The role of the immigration judge is plagued by even more than narrow 
jurisdiction because the immigration judge’s authority within that narrow jurisdiction is constrained. 
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functions against the system’s limited review power over many 
discretionary actions.  A third set of conflicting signals is found by 
examining the nature and tenor of a removal hearing.  By definition, a 
removal hearing is just another type of civil administrative adjudication.  
In reality, the system operates with the attitude of a criminal trial. 
Immigration adjudication has moved toward greater separation of 
functions over time.164  For example, adjudicators no longer also 
represent the government in proceedings or work for the same agency as 
immigration enforcement.165  This evolution tells a story of a move 
toward a more formal adjudication system that depends on a professional 
corps of adjudicators who focus on adjudication.  But these adjudicators 
are still under the thumb of the nation’s top law enforcement official and 
lack decisional independence.  Placing these adjudicators under the 
control and supervision of the Attorney General conflicts with the 
concerns that pushed the system towards greater separation of functions.  
Creating new adjudication positions with decisional independence would 
alleviate this conflicting signal. 
But the lack of decisional independence contrasted against a desire 
for separation of functions is not the only conflicting signal.  The 
increased separation of functions also stands in contrast to a system 
where discretion reigns supreme.166  Professor Gerald Neuman 
uncovered one example of the strong role of discretion by arguing that 
efforts to move cases faster through the Board of Immigration Appeals 
resulted in the Board’s ineffective supervision of immigration judges’ 
exercises of discretion.167  The Board’s actual level of oversight, then, is 
less than it may appear.  The same reasoning applies to unreviewable 
exercises of discretion vested in nonadjudicatory executive officers.168  
Because the substantive law delegates unreviewable discretion to 
nonadjudicatory executive officials, the substantive law dictates that 
immigration adjudicators are powerless over those decisions.  Thus, the 
system is sometimes programmed to effectuate little to no actual review. 
                                                     
 164. See Jill E. Family, Conflicting Signals: Understanding US Immigration Reform Through the 
Evolution of US Immigration Law, 40 REVISTA CATALANA DE DRET PÚBLIC 145, 155–58 (2010). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Neuman, supra note 60, at 631–33. 
 167. See id. at 633 (arguing that the streamlining reforms weakened the Board’s ability “to 
promote consistency in the decentralized exercise of authority by Immigration Judges of widely 
varying temperaments and tastes”). 
 168. See, e.g., S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941, 942 n.7 (B.I.A. 2006) (discussing how Congress 
delegated power to grant a waiver of the terrorism inadmissibility grounds to the Attorney General, 
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security but not to immigration judges or the 
Board). 
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Injecting decisional independence into the system would do little to 
address this conflicting signal.  Decisional independence only carries as 
far as the independent adjudicator’s jurisdiction.  If the adjudicator lacks 
jurisdiction, either formally or effectively, then the adjudicator’s 
independence becomes less relevant.  An adjudicator with decisional 
independence is a necessary goal, but the breadth of that independent 
adjudicator’s power is important.  If the substantive law does not allow 
this adjudicator to review crucial decisions, then the decisional 
independence afforded may not be satisfying. 
Another set of conflicting signals comes from the criminal-like tenor 
of immigration adjudication.169  Removal proceedings are civil agency 
adjudications in name.170  In practice, however, the tone of a removal 
proceeding resembles a criminal trial, where the noncitizen is on “trial” 
and the Department of Homeland Security attorney “prosecutes.”  A 
removal action begins with the issuance of a Notice to Appear, which 
lists the government’s “charges” against the noncitizen.171  During the 
hearing before the immigration judge, the foreign national responds to 
the charges and also applies for relief from removal, if available.172  A 
noncitizen, for example, may admit to the immigration violation charge 
but seek asylum (refugee) status as relief from the immigration violation.  
The hearing would then focus on the noncitizen’s eligibility for asylum. 
To determine eligibility, the foreign national will most likely present 
testimony and evidence in support of his or her application for asylum.  
To show that he or she is eligible for asylum, the noncitizen must show 
past “persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
political opinion.”173  Because most individuals do not flee their home 
country with tangible evidence of persecution, most of these cases turn 
on questions of credibility—whether the immigration judge believes the 
testimony of the noncitizen as to events that occurred in the home 
country.174  The government attorney often will attempt to rebut the 
testimony and evidence, mainly through a tough cross-examination 
                                                     
 169. Despite the increasing criminalization of immigration law, the adjudication system remains 
civil and lacks the procedural protections of a criminal system.  See Legomsky, supra note 109, at 
472.  This discussion focuses on the tone of the civil hearing. 
 170. See id. at 511–12. 
 171. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2006). 
 172. See id. § 1229a. 
 173. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 
 174. See Armen H. Merjian, A Guinean Refugee’s Odyssey: In Re Jarno, The Biggest Asylum 
Case in U.S. History and What It Tells Us About Our Broken System, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 649, 
666, 685–87 (2009). 
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aimed at destroying the noncitizen’s credibility.175 The immigration 
judge is directed to adopt an inquisitorial role, and will interject with 
questions during the hearing.176  The search for inconsistency may not 
account for language, cultural, or psychological factors.177 
Thus, the government’s objective can seem to be to defeat the 
application for asylum through any method, without considering the 
merits of the case.178  Recently, a court of appeals reminded the 
government that its role is to “seek justice rather than victory,” and was 
“distressed” that the government failed to live up to that duty in the case 
before it.179  The government’s goal is to “convict,” rather than to find 
cases where relief is appropriate or even a more neutral approach to 
simply enforce the law.180  The perception is that the government views 
as a victory a denial of relief accompanied by a removal order; in other 
words, a “guilty” verdict.181  The opposite result—essentially, “not 
guilty”—necessarily would be categorized as a loss.182  Thus, despite that 
                                                     
 175. See Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable in Adversarial 
Administrative Deportation Proceedings: Lessons from the Department of Labor Rules of Evidence, 
57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 135–41 (2007). 
 176. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1); OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.16(e), at 77 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ 
OCIJPracManual/Practice%20Manual%20Final_compressedPDF.pdf. 
 177. See Stuart L. Lustig, Symptoms of Trauma Among Political Asylum Applicants: Don’t Be 
Fooled, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 725, 729–33 (2008) (discussing the intersection of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and asylum credibility determinations). 
 178. See Kang v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (admonishing the 
government’s appeal by stating that “[i]t is disappointing, even shocking, that the government fails 
to acknowledge that the evidence . . . compels the conclusion that [the applicant] will likely be 
tortured,” as well as by reminding the government that “it is duty-bound to ‘cut square corners’ and 
seek justice rather than victory”); Lance Jolley, Where O’ Where Has the Eleventh Circuit Gone? An 
Exploratory Analysis of the Declining Percentage of Published Asylum-Related Wins, IMMIGR. 
LITIG. BULL., June 2010, at 3, http://www.justice.gov/civil/oil/ImmigrationBulletin/June_2010.pdf 
(analyzing the decline of the government’s “win rate” in an article by a government attorney that 
appeared in a publication of the Office of Immigration Litigation of the Department of Justice); 
Merjian, supra note 174, at 668 (“[Government] lawyers have assumed fully adversarial roles, 
fighting asylum claims vigorously, regardless of their merit.  ‘Before 9/11, we used to be able to 
negotiate with [the government], and work something out in a case like this,’ said one member of [an 
asylum applicant’s] legal team, ‘but post-9/11, their lawyers try to cream you.’”). 
 179. Kang, 611 F.3d at 167. 
 180. See APPLESEED, supra note 25, at 4 (recommending that government immigration attorneys 
be reminded “that their mission is to enforce the law as written, not to deport every immigrant”). 
 181. In its annual report, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement highlighted its attorneys’ 
“vital role” in removal and touted that “ICE attorneys obtained 91,374 final orders of removal.”  
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL REPORT: 
PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY 28 (2008), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annual-report/2008annual-report.pdf. 
 182. See APPLESEED, supra note 25, at 16 (“Many of our interviewees believe that [government 
immigration attorneys] face extreme pressure to remove from the United States every person who 
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the removal proceeding is a civil proceeding, the hearing plays out like a 
head-to-head battle where the noncitizen’s interests are viewed as 
inherently opposed to the government’s interests. 
Adding to the criminal-like tone is the fact that half of immigration 
court hearings take place while the foreign national is in detention.183  
This feature only adds to the feeling of a criminal trial, despite, again, 
that the proceeding is officially civil.  To make matters worse, the 
adjudication system increasingly relies on video hearings, where the 
noncitizen appears through closed-circuit television.184 These 
“defendants” have the added disadvantage of appearing to the 
immigration judge as a grainy, two-dimensional image.185 
Creating more independent adjudicators may partially resolve this 
conflicting signal.  An independent immigration judge corps may send a 
clearer signal that the proceeding is, in fact, designed to be held in a 
neutral forum.  But this change will not necessarily address how the 
government prosecutes these cases or the foreign national’s growing 
resemblance to a criminal defendant. 
3. The Lack of De Facto Independence for Immigration Adjudicators 
Independence from the Attorney General carries the promise of 
increased decisional independence.  Removed from any other executive 
agency, immigration adjudicators could objectively adjudicate cases 
without fear of politically motivated repercussions.  This promise, 
however, may not be fulfilled if immigration adjudicators are not given a 
prerequisite to independence: better working conditions that will allow 
immigration adjudicators to achieve de facto independence.186  More 
specifically, immigration adjudicators need smaller caseloads, more law 
clerks, and more training. 
                                                                                                                       
comes before an Immigration Court, even if there is scant basis for doing so.”). 
 183. Half of the cases completed by the immigration courts in fiscal year 2009 involved detained 
foreign nationals.  EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 127, at O1. 
 184. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1181 (2009); 
see also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, supra note 176, § 4.7, at 58–59. 
 185. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, supra note 184, at 1184–88 (discussing 
the disadvantages of appearing in immigration court via video). 
 186. Current proposals for structural reform acknowledge the need for increased resources to 
immigration adjudicators.  See ABA STUDY, supra note 11, at ES-28; APPLESEED, supra note 25, at 
10–12, RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 25, at 100–18; Legomsky, supra note 25, at 1640, 1651–
57; Marks, supra note 12, at 8–9. 
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As explained above, caseloads are simply too high.187  To meet this 
growing demand, an immigration judge is on his or her own.  While 
there are law clerks, each law clerk works for about four immigration 
judges.188  With little support, immigration judges must face pro se 
litigants in over sixty percent of their cases.189  In attempting to manage 
an impossible docket, immigration judges are wearing themselves out.  
According to a recent study, immigration judges scored higher on a 
burnout test than any other professional group, including prison 
wardens.190 
The system demands too much from its adjudicators.  As the above 
discussion reveals, the substantive law is extremely complex, and 
adjudications involve complex factual issues as well.  Immigration 
judges often hear claims for asylum.  Again, in an asylum case, 
immigration judges must not only apply the complex statutory, 
regulatory, and subregulatory framework, but must also make factual 
determinations on country conditions and the credibility of the 
applicant’s claim.  These cases require an immigration judge not only to 
be an expert on the law, but also on the social and political conditions 
and cultural norms of any given country.  Familiarity with cultural norms 
allows an immigration judge to make credibility determinations by 
measuring an applicant’s demeanor against the applicant’s own cultural 
norms.  Also, because credibility is determinative, adjudication requires 
an actual hearing that lasts at least half of a day and probably longer.  For 
an immigration judge to keep up with the docket, it would not be 
possible to provide the type of in-depth attention that should be paid 
when the claim itself alleges that the claimant has a well-founded fear of 
persecution in the home country.  In fact, one court of appeals judge has 
explained that under these kinds of working conditions, “[i]mmigration 
judges simply cannot be expected to make thorough and competent 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.”191 
To compound the problem, immigration judges are often left on their 
own to keep up with the fast-changing intricacies of immigration law, 
                                                     
 187. See supra Part III.B.1.d.i. 
 188. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts 
Expand, Resulting Wait Times Grow (June 18, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/. 
 189. See Markowitz, supra note 106, at 544–45 (acknowledging the burden of pro se 
representation on immigration judges); supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
 190. Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National 
Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 60 (2008). 
 191. Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of C.J. John M. Walker, Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit). 
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with little group training.192  De facto independence depends on 
sufficient time to stay abreast of the law and to deepen one’s skills and 
understanding of the law.  The lack of training opportunities is linked to 
the overwhelming dockets.  While recognizing efforts to improve 
training, Dana Marks, the President of the National Association of 
Immigration Judges, has called such improvements “practically 
meaningless when those they are meant to benefit do not have any time 
actually provided to put them to use.”193  Due to the need to keep 
deciding cases at a fast clip to try to keep up with the docket, 
immigration judges do not have time to train.  It is constantly game day 
for these immigration judges.  Such pressure has led immigration judges 
to describe their role as simply a part of an immigration law factory.194 
The lack of sufficient resources at the Board of Immigration Appeals 
is best exemplified by the “streamlining” regulations expanded under 
Attorney General John Ashcroft.195  Ashcroft’s response to a large 
backlog of 56,000 cases at the Board was to forbid Board members from 
providing any reasons for their decisions in large categories of cases.196  
Instead, Board members were required to issue an “Affirmance Without 
Opinion,” which contained only two sentences of boilerplate language.197  
Ashcroft also reacted to the backlog by shrinking the membership of the 
Board and then, in turn, requiring more single member adjudications, 
rather than three-member panel adjudications.198 
The paucity of resources for immigration judges and the streamlining 
reforms exemplify the danger of underfunded adjudication.  Even if 
reform would eliminate the role of the Attorney General in dictating how 
                                                     
 192. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales proposed more training in 2006.  EOIR Reports 
Progress in Implementing Reforms, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 885, 886 (2007).  In 2008, only a 
virtual training conference took place.  RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., supra note 25, at 110.  Participating 
immigration judges gave the virtual training low marks.  Id. 
 193. Marks, supra note 12, at 13. 
 194. Stuart L. Lustig et al., Burnout and Stress Among United States Immigration Judges, 13 
BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 22, 30 (2008). 
 195. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 7309, 7310–13 (proposed Feb. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 280); see also 
Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 
54,878, 54,880 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3). 
 196. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for Panel 
Review, and Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,654, 34,656 (proposed June 18, 
2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (describing Ashcroft’s actions in 2002). 
 197. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. 
Reg. at 7315; see also Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. at 54,903. 
 198. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for Panel 
Review, and Publications of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. at 34,655–56. 
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to allocate insufficient resources, the problem of insufficient resources 
would not disappear.  Immigration adjudicators need adequate time and 
support to perform their adjudicatory function.  De facto independence 
demands more than just decisional independence—it demands the 
resources that will allow immigration adjudicators to benefit from the 
positive change in status. 
4. Diversions from Immigration Adjudication 
Imagine an immigration adjudication system filled with independent, 
able adjudicators who apply the law to the facts with the time and 
resources to consider thoughtfully each matter.  Now imagine a scenario 
where this desirable system exists, but immigration enforcement officials 
are authorized to choose who gets access to it.  Any gains of decisional 
independence would be stymied by a gatekeeping function that could 
keep an improved system out of reach for large classes of noncitizens.  
This is the danger of the immigration adjudication diversion.  Through a 
diversion, the executive branch is permitted to make end-runs around the 
entire system.199 
Diverted individuals never access the immigration adjudication 
system, no matter its state.  Instead, these individuals are subject to a 
shadow adjudication process that avoids the procedures and protections 
of the formal system.  Each year, the government completes millions of 
diversions from the immigration adjudication system.200  There are many 
manifestations of this phenomenon.  I describe three here: the 
adjudication waiver of the Visa Waiver Program; stipulated orders of 
removal; and a proposed adjudication waiver linked to legalization.201 
Under the Visa Waiver Program, certain noncitizens are able to 
travel to the United States on a temporary basis without a visa.202  The 
advantage to the noncitizen is that the program eliminates the need to 
complete the visa application process abroad.  Instead, the noncitizen 
travels to the United States with his or her visa-less passport.203  Upon 
arrival, a frontline border officer decides whether each applicant under 
                                                     
 199. I have previously categorized and examined the numerous ways that the government may 
divert foreign nationals from the immigration adjudication system.  Family, supra note 4. 
 200. Id. at 612–13. 
 201. I have previously described these and other types of diversions.  See id. at 611–32.  The 
ABA Study discusses the use of expedited removal and administrative removal of aggravated felons.  
ABA STUDY, supra note 11, at ES-23 to -24. 
 202. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a), (c) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 203. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a) (2006). 
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the program is admissible to the United States.204  This involves applying 
the statutory framework that provides grounds of inadmissibility (such as 
certain criminal convictions and previous immigration violations).205  In 
exchange for the elimination of the visa requirement, the program 
extracts a waiver of adjudication rights.206  Noncitizens participating in 
the program must waive any right to challenge the border officer’s 
determination as to their admissibility207 but must also prospectively 
waive any right to challenge a future attempt to remove the noncitizen 
from the United States, unless the noncitizen has a claim for asylum.208  
In fiscal year 2008, over seventeen million admissions took place under 
the program.209  Each admission carries a waiver of adjudication rights.  
Thus, for participants in the Visa Waiver Program, independent 
adjudicators have no impact, unless the noncitizen has an asylum claim, 
because the program’s mandatory waiver prevents participants from 
accessing the immigration adjudication system. 
The second diversion example is a stipulated order of removal.  By 
stipulating to removal, a noncitizen eliminates the need for an 
adjudication to determine removability or to apply for relief.210  A 
noncitizen who stipulates to removal therefore waives access to the 
immigration adjudication system.  In 2008, it was estimated there would 
                                                     
 204. 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)(1) (2010). 
 205. Id. 
 206. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b). 
 207. Id. § 1187(b)(1), (g); see also 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(a)(1) (“Such refusal and removal shall be 
made at the level of the port director or officer-in-charge, or an officer acting in that capacity, and 
shall be effected without referral of the alien to an immigration judge for further inquiry, 
examination, or hearing, except [for] an alien who presents himself or herself as an applicant for 
admission under section 217 of the Act and applies for asylum in the United States . . . .”). 
 208. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b)(1) (“Such removal shall be determined 
by the district director who has jurisdiction over the place where the alien is found, and shall be 
effected without referral of the alien to an immigration judge for a determination of deportability, 
except [for] an alien who was admitted as a Visa Waiver Program visitor who applies for asylum in 
the United States . . . .”). 
 209. RANDALL MONGER & MACREADIE BARR, DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 
NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 7 tbl.9 (2009), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ni_fr_2008.pdf.  The Office of 
Immigration Statistics reported the number of admissions, which does not coincide with the number 
of individuals using the Visa Waiver Program because an individual could be admitted more than 
once in a fiscal year.  Id. at 2.  Also, these numbers refer only to admissions and do not include those 
rejected admission at the border.  Id.  For instance, in May 2008, a Customs and Border Patrol 
spokesperson indicated that in the seven months prior, 3300 applicants had been rejected under the 
Visa Waiver Program and more than eight million had been admitted.  Nina Bernstein, Italian’s 
Detention Illustrates Dangers Foreign Visitors Face, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at A14. 
 210. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b). 
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be approximately 35,000 stipulated removals.211  As with Visa Waiver 
Program participants, any improvements to the immigration adjudication 
system are meaningless to a noncitizen who never accesses the system 
due to a stipulation that the individual is removable.  If the stipulation is 
the product of real, fair negotiation, the waiver of access may not be 
troublesome.  The government’s implementation of stipulated orders of 
removal, however, raises serious concerns when measured against basic 
principles of administrative process design.212  If government coercion, 
misinformation, or a lack of information is motivating a noncitizen’s 
agreement to removal, that implicates not only how the diversion fares 
under basic principles of administrative process design, but also 
highlights how, through such a diversion, the government could deflect 
noncitizens from an improved immigration adjudication system. 
While not yet law, a proposed adjudication waiver linked to 
legalization is the third example provided here because it perhaps 
represents a new type of diversion—the no-option waiver.  The U.S. 
Senate endorsed an adjudication waiver as a condition to legalize 
immigration status.213  Under the Senate bill, the application for 
legalization would have included a waiver of adjudication rights.  To 
apply, one would be required to waive “any right to judicial review or to 
contest any removal action, other than on the basis of” asylum, 
withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture, or 
certain relief provided by Cancellation of Removal.214  Because the 
waiver is an application requirement, there really is no waiver-free 
alternative, which makes this proposed waiver a no-option waiver.  An 
estimated twelve million individuals reside in the United States without 
permission.215  If a no-option adjudication waiver is enacted as a part of 
any legalization program, it would affect millions.  For purposes of 
improving immigration adjudication, this concept is dangerous because it 
could start a trend of requiring waivers to adjudication in exchange for 
immigration benefits.  If such a trend develops, an improved immigration 
adjudication system would be meaningless to those required to waive 
access to it. 
                                                     
 211. JAYASHRI SRIKANTIAH & KAREN TUMLIN, BACKGROUNDER: STIPULATED REMOVAL 1 
(2008), http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/removpsds/stipulated-removal-bkgrndr-2008-11.pdf. 
 212. See Family, supra note 4, at 642–43, 645–46. 
 213. Immigrant Accountability Act of 2006, S. 2611 ES, 109th Cong. § 601(b) (2006) (adding  
§ 245C(b)(7)(C)). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Gabriel Escobar, The Complex Tapestry of the Undocumented: Day Laborers Are Just One 
Strand, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 28, 2006), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/14/the-complex-
tapestry-of-the-undocumented. 
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To ensure that improvements to immigration adjudication are not so 
restricted as to render them meaningless to large numbers of noncitizens, 
proposals to reform immigration adjudication must consider the practical 
effect of diversions from immigration adjudication.  Reforms must take 
care to integrate restrictions on the government’s use of such diversions 
so that diversions do not effectively neuter any improvements to the 
immigration adjudication system, including greater decisional 
independence. 
5. Weakened Judicial Review 
The federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review all of the output 
of this troubled administrative adjudication system.  There are three 
types of limits on federal court jurisdiction: substantive; timing; and 
form.  The substantive restrictions carve out whole classes of decisions 
from judicial review.  For example, there are restrictions on jurisdiction 
to review discretionary decisions and to review removal orders based on 
criminal convictions.216  One timing restriction shortens the period within 
which a foreign national could seek judicial review.217  One type of form 
restriction eliminates certain types of immigration class actions.218 
Despite the narrowing of the federal courts’ jurisdiction over 
immigration cases, courts of appeals have expressed deep concern with 
the quality of the output of the administrative adjudication process 
through their review of those cases where jurisdiction remains.  The 
courts of appeals mostly hear asylum cases, and those cases give plenty 
of examples of dissatisfaction with the work of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals and of immigration judges.  Courts of appeals have issued 
opinions identifying immigration judges’ biases towards foreign 
nationals, intimidating and demeaning behavior towards foreign 
nationals, and poor legal analysis.219  Judge Richard Posner of the Court 
                                                     
 216. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)–(C) (2006). 
 217. Id. § 1252(b)(1). 
 218. Id. § 1252(e)(1). 
 219. See, e.g., Ayala v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 943 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The decision of 
the Board [of Immigration Appeals] is riddled with error.”); Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1052 
(9th Cir. 2008) (finding the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding was not supported by 
substantial evidence); Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 492–93 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that prior 
proceedings were fundamentally unfair); Kaita v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 522 F.3d 288, 301 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (noting the “antagonistic manner” of the immigration judge’s interruptions); Floroiu v. 
Gonzales, 481 F.3d 970, 976 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that the immigration judge’s handling of the 
case “denied [the foreign national’s] right to be heard”); Wang v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 423 
F.3d 260, 270–71 (3d Cir. 2005) (criticizing the immigration judge’s “contemptuous tone” and 
consideration of irrelevant personal judgments); Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1193 
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit wrote in a 2005 opinion that 
immigration adjudication had fallen “below the minimum standards of 
legal justice.”220 
The federal courts are implicated in the immigration adjudication 
crisis beyond their role in highlighting the lapses in the quality of 
administrative decision-making.  The federal courts, perhaps 
counterintuitively given the cuts in jurisdiction, have also seen huge 
increases in the numbers of immigration appeals filed in the courts of 
appeals.  In fiscal year 2001, 1760 appeals from decisions of the Board 
were filed in the courts of appeals.221  By fiscal year 2003, the number 
filed reached 8833,222 and the number rose to 12,349 appeals filed in 
fiscal year 2005.223  By 2009, the number dropped to 7518, but that 
number is still high compared to 2001 levels, and Board appeals make up 
roughly eighty-eight percent of all administrative appeals in the courts of 
appeals.224 
Granting decisional independence to administrative adjudicators 
would not address the problems presented by a lack of judicial review.  
In fact, a key to the success of the administrative adjudication component 
of the system is the existence of more robust judicial review.  More 
recent proposals for immigration adjudication reform recognize this,225 
while some older proposals argued that strengthened administrative 
review served as a justification for decreasing the role of the federal 
courts.226  Others have discussed the benefits and costs of judicial review 
in immigration adjudication.227  This discussion focuses on the role of 
                                                                                                                       
(9th Cir. 2005) (criticizing the immigration judge’s “lack of coherent explanation”). 
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 222. Id. 
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 224. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 94 tbl.B-3 
(2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc= 
/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/appendices/B03Sep09.pdf. 
 225. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 25, at 1696. 
 226. See, e.g., Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1980). 
 227. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS 
IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 272–80 (1987); Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 60, at 63–64; 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial 
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1628–31 (2000) [hereinafter Legomsky, Fear and Loathing]; 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1205, 
1209–16 (1989); Martin, supra note 156, at 1361–63. 
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judicial review in the context of reforming administrative adjudication.228  
This discussion leaves aside constitutional questions raised by the 
elimination of judicial review and instead focuses on what the existence 
and nature of judicial review means for the functioning of the whole 
adjudication system. 
Judicial review is a key to success for improvement of the 
immigration adjudication system for several reasons.  First, judicial 
review helps to boost immigration esteem.  Second, judicial review is 
essential to a more efficient system.  Third, judicial review increases the 
legitimacy of the entire adjudication system. 
Judicial review is essential to the success of immigration 
adjudication reform because of the immigration esteem problem 
discussed above.229  Narrowing judicial review reinforces the stereotype 
of immigration law as a lesser field.  It confines the legal practice to 
administrative adjudication and eliminates the prestige of practice before 
federal courts of appeals.230  It also sends the signal that the field is not 
important.  After all, if Congress does not think these litigants worthy to 
access the federal courts, it sends a signal that these litigants and this 
type of litigation are not worthy of attention.  Also, if the practice is 
relegated to a dysfunctional administrative system where there is no hope 
of judicial review, that demotion may further discourage attorneys from 
entering the field. 
A more efficient system depends on robust judicial review.  Critics 
of judicial review in immigration cases label it a source of delay in the 
adjudication system.231  Subscribers to this theory believe that 
immigration litigants are motivated by delay and therefore judicial 
                                                     
 228. The administrative adjudication components and judicial review are mutually dependent.  
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the 
Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1986) (arguing that “administrative review and 
judicial review should be seen as parts of a single, continuous, adjudication process”); Richard L. 
Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 
1114, 1144 (1990) (defining the “administrative lawmaking system” to include administrative and 
judicial review); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1179 
(1984) (discussing the dependent relationship between administrative and judicial review in the 
context of due process analysis). 
 229. See supra Part III.B.1.d.iii. 
 230. Perceived prestige characteristics of the courts of appeals include superior decision-making, 
geographically expansive jurisdiction and higher quality judges.  See Currie & Goodman, supra note 
163, at 12; see also Colyer et al., supra note 143, at 470–71 (reporting “widespread interest in 
representing immigrants before the Second Circuit where needed, in any type of case”). 
 231. See Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review During Immigration Reform: The Certificate 
of Reviewability, 8 NEV. L.J. 499, 521–22 (2008). 
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review is an invitation to delay deportation.232  While eliminating 
unnecessary delays would increase the efficiency of immigration 
adjudication, not all delays are necessarily inefficient.  Efficiency 
indicates not just that the job is being done but that it is being done as 
quickly as possible while maintaining an acceptable level of quality.  
Efficiency concerns are not an excuse to do less of a job and to mislabel 
any resulting time-savings as efficiency gains.  Not all time savings are 
true efficiency gains if quality diminishes to an unacceptable level.  After 
all, a car without an engine would be more fuel efficient (it uses less 
fuel—none!), but the car now fails to do its job.  In actuality, a car is 
more efficient when it performs its purpose but does so with less fuel. 
Looking at the efficiency of the immigration adjudication system in 
the true sense of that word reveals that judicial review plays a key role in 
the efficient operation of the system.  If the system is to perform the job 
“in the best possible manner with the least waste of time and effort” 
while also in a “competent” manner, judicial review must contribute.233  
Judicial review is not a waste of time and effort. 
There is ample evidence that eliminating judicial review has not led 
to a system that competently performs “in the best possible manner with 
the least waste of time and effort.”  First, the system has been operating 
since 1996 without judicial review over many key issues and kinds of 
immigration cases.234  The absence of judicial review has not cured the 
system of its problems.  In fact, the restrictions on judicial review have 
caused new forms of litigation that simply detract or delay participants 
from litigating the issues at the heart of their case.  As Professor Lenni 
Benson has argued, stripping judicial review creates litigation over the 
court’s jurisdiction.235  This is not efficient.  What would be efficient 
would be to litigate the substantive issues with the least waste of time 
and effort, rather than to argue about the meaning and constitutionality of 
the jurisdiction-stripping provisions. 
Second, a historical, pre-1996, narrowing of immigration judicial 
review also did not extinguish calls for reform of the system.  There was 
a time when deportation orders followed a judicial review path that 
                                                     
 232. See id. 
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included both district court and court of appeals review.236  Congress 
eliminated the role of the district courts in 1961 in response to concerns 
about how long it took to effectuate a deportation order.237  This reform 
set the stage for further narrowing in 1996, which was similarly justified 
by delay concerns.238 
Third, the streamlining experiment at the Board is also evidence that 
eliminating review is not truly efficient.  When the Board ceased to 
provide reasoned decisions in large categories of cases, litigants did not 
shrug their shoulders and walk away.  Instead, they sought out available 
alternative litigation opportunities, such as review in the federal courts.239  
Thus, the work simply shifted to other locales.  As one observer aptly 
commented, the streamlining experiment led to a “false economy.”240  
The Board stopped performing its function, which is different from 
performing its function “with the least waste of time and effort.”  The 
experience of the streamlining regulations shows that eliminating a layer 
of review is not itself efficient both because it merely diverted litigation 
and because quitting is not what defines efficiency.  A prerequisite to 
greater efficiency is that one must actually do the job. 
Judicial review, in fact, is the mechanism to make sure the 
administrative review components are doing their job.  Judicial review 
can perform this function through its oversight role.241  Critics who truly 
desire a more efficient system (rather than a system that just provides 
less) should embrace the possibilities of judicial review.  After all, 
judicial review can be deferential while still existing as a check on 
administrative adjudicators. 
At the same time, this oversight role increases the legitimacy of the 
administrative review component.  Oversight is important not only 
because adjudicators at the administrative level will know that a case is 
subject to review, but also because the supervision sends a signal to 
litigants and to the public that someone is keeping an eye on the system.  
This role of the federal courts has been diminished, but not eliminated, 
since 1996.  Courts of appeals have taken the lead in pointing out 
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deficiencies at the administrative level.242  However, because courts of 
appeals only see a limited slice of the output of administrative 
adjudication, no one oversees those decisions that are not subject to 
review.  If the quality of adjudication is low in the cases immigration 
judges and the Board know a court of appeals may see, what is the 
quality of those decisions these adjudicators know to be exempted from 
review?243  Without judicial review, the answer to that question remains 
unknown, leaves room for doubt, and raises suspicion.  If Congress 
narrows judicial review further, it would silence the main existing 
mechanism for shedding light on the status of administrative 
adjudication.  After all, if Congress had eliminated all judicial review in 
1996, it would have prevented courts of appeals from discovering the 
inadequacies of administrative adjudication since then. 
Greater decisional independence for administrative adjudicators 
could lead to a more respected administrative review process, which 
could make the entire system more efficient.  If decisions of the 
administrative review process are more acceptable, fewer appeals to the 
federal courts may be necessary.244  As the system stands now, 
immigration litigants view court of appeals judges with confidence, but 
they are the only actors in the adjudication system that receive such 
respect.245  In a pyramid adjudication system, the administrative review 
levels should filter cases so that only the most novel and complicated 
issues reach the judicial review stage.  If the administrative review 
process occasionally breaks down and performs subpar, then the judicial 
review stage can catch such errors.  Because the administrative 
components of the system are viewed as permanently broken, litigants 
have motivation to appeal everything, with the hope that the federal 
courts will give the case a thoughtful, reasoned look.  There is no reason 
why the first thoughtful, reasoned look should wait until the court of 
appeals. 
The detriment of subpar administrative adjudication is visible 
through the decisions of courts of appeals.  For example, after eight years 
in litigation, the immigration case of Hu v. Holder remained 
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unresolved.246  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
remanded this case twice.  The first time, after an affirmance by the 
Board, the Second Circuit remanded the case on the ground that the 
immigration judge’s order consisted of “unspecified inconsistencies, 
flawed reasoning and misunderstanding of evidence.”247  On remand, 
four years after the original hearing, the immigration judge attempted to 
clarify the original decision.248  In so doing, the immigration judge 
raised, for the first time, doubts about the applicant’s credibility based on 
her demeanor.249  After another Board affirmance, the case worked its 
way back to the Second Circuit.250  The Second Circuit could not affirm 
the immigration judge’s “clarified” decision under the substantial 
evidence standard because, among other things, it was incredulous that 
this immigration judge could so clearly remember the applicant’s 
demeanor four years later, especially when the original opinion made no 
mention of the applicant’s demeanor.251  The Second Circuit stated: “No 
evidence in the record suggests that these analyses are based on anything 
but the [immigration judge’s] recollection of Hu’s demeanor when she 
testified nearly four years before.”252  Referencing the “onerous” 
caseloads of immigration judges, the court concluded that “a reasonable 
adjudicator would not rely on his four year old memory.”253  So, in 2009, 
the Second Circuit found itself remanding this case for a second time, 
recommending that the case be assigned to a different immigration judge 
due to the poor quality of adjudication.254  The poor quality of 
adjudication has caused this case to chew up the time of the Second 
Circuit, as well as leaving the applicant’s immigration status in limbo for 
over eight years. 
While decisional independence may attract better adjudicators, 
which in turn may lower the burden on the federal courts, it is important 
to remember the other hurdles to improve administrative adjudication 
discussed here.  Decisional independence alone will still leave a troubled 
administrative adjudication system.  That troubled system will continue 
to cry out for federal court supervision.  Even if all of what ails 
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administrative adjudication is cured, the system still needs judicial 
review to promote efficiency, to perform its oversight role, to lend 
legitimacy to the system, and to ease immigration law’s esteem problem. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article reveals the complicated dynamics of the immigration 
adjudication crisis.  A lack of decisional independence does contribute to 
the crisis, but there are other substantial contributors.  The complicated 
dynamics of the crisis are revealed by examining five contributors to the 
crisis other than a lack of decisional independence.  First, substantive 
immigration law is a contributor to the crisis, as it contributes to the huge 
backlogs in the system, the extreme lack of lawyers in the system, and 
immigration law’s esteem problem.  Second, the conflicting signals of 
the system hold it back by confusing any sense of mission.  The creation 
of more independent adjudicators will not resolve all of these conflicting 
signals.  Third, de facto independence for immigration adjudicators is 
crucial because a position that carries formal decisional independence 
does not come with a guarantee that the position will carry the resources 
necessary to allow effective use of that status.  Fourth, the growing use 
of diversions from immigration adjudication threatens the usefulness of 
any improvements to immigration adjudication.  For a diverted foreign 
national with no access to the adjudication system, the state of that 
system is less relevant.  Fifth, the system requires more robust judicial 
review, no matter the job security of its administrative adjudicators. 
While a lack of decisional independence is a major shortcoming, this 
Article shows that creating more independent immigration adjudicators 
will not address all of the system’s deficiencies.  Fixing administrative 
adjudication is a complicated task, and a magic bullet is elusive. 
